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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines whether the balancing of security interests against refoulement to
torture, as advanced by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Suresh Case, is a helpful
legal development for negotiating the complex security and protection challenges in
the post 9/11 era. This thesis assesses the controversial issues raised by the balancing
approach in Suresh and finds the following. Firstly, by allowing refoulement to torture
under exceptional circumstances, the Court ignored Canada’s obligations under the
Convention against Torture and the absolute prohibition of torture as a norm of ius
cogens. This violation of international law through the Suresh exception was influential
in foreign jurisdictions. The erosion of the absolute prohibition of torture, in Canada
and internationally, is not only illegal but is particularly troubling at a time when
security measures infringing human rights, such as extraordinary rendition, are
proliferating. Secondly, this thesis analyzes the difficulties of determining who is a
threat to national security. Terrorism remains undefined in international law and the
Suresh attempt to define the scope of threat domestically raises considerable legal
difficulties. For example, it gives rise to the controversial issue of whether an indirect
threat to a state is sufficient to justify refoulement to torture, and leaves open what
degree of association to a terrorist organization qualifies an individual as a security
threat. These debates expose how susceptible the term terrorism is to political
manipulation and misuse. Thirdly, this work considers whether there are legal
alternatives to the Suresh exception that could better protect national security without
undermining the prohibition of refoulement to torture – alternatives better suited to
meeting contemporary challenges. This thesis concludes that the Suresh exception is
not only unhelpful legally, it is a highly troubling decision that unnecessarily
undermines important human rights laws at a time when the opposite is needed.
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I. Introduction
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the concerns of states on how to protect
themselves from possible security threats have intensified. As a consequence, this led
to an increase in security measures and stricter sanctions against potentially dangerous
individuals. However, these measures cease to be rational when states sacrifice human
rights, often targeting particularly the rights of migrants, for the sake of national
security. When such trends occur, we return to a legal question repeatedly raised in
human rights law: How far may states go in order to protect their security interests?
The Suresh decision1 was a particularly controversial example of the periodic
reconsideration of this legal question, and the case challenged previous understandings
of non-refoulement to torture.2 Canada had granted Manickavasagam Suresh refugee
status to protect him from persecution in his country of origin. Later he was identified
as being a security threat due to his alleged involvement with a terrorist organization.
The Minister of Immigration ordered the deportation of Suresh who claimed that he
would be subjected to torture upon return to Sri Lanka. The Canadian Supreme Court
faced the task of balancing Canada’s security interests against the refoulement of
Suresh to the risk of torture. In its decision, the Court prioritized the state’s security
interests and declared that under exceptional circumstances it would be possible to
deport a refugee even if s/he faces the risk of torture upon return.
There are several controversial issues in Suresh. Firstly, the Suresh exception violates
the absolute prohibition of torture under international law. The risk of torture should
never be balanced against security interests, it is a red line states may not cross. With
terrorist attacks being a common concern these days, states go to great lengths to
protect national security. It is critical to navigate complex security challenges while at
the same time safeguarding individuals’ human rights. However, many security
measures taken by states border on the illegal, while some of them, such as refoulement
to torture and extraordinary rendition for instance, clearly violate the absolute
prohibition of torture. Nevertheless, states tried using the Suresh exception on different
1

Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can. S.C.C.).
[hereinafter Suresh]
2
The principle on non-refoulement derives its name from the French word “refouler”, meaning to
repel or drive back.

occasions on the basis of fending off dangers to national security. But how can a court
or state determine who is a threat to national security? This relates closely to the issue
that terrorism remains undefined in international law. The Suresh attempt to define the
scope of threat domestically raises considerable legal difficulties and exposes how
susceptible the term terrorism is to political manipulation and misuse.
To prevent this practice from spreading, it is necessary for the Canadian Supreme Court
to overturn Suresh at next opportunity, and for the courts of other jurisdictions not to
entertain the argument of exceptional circumstances allowing for refoulement to
torture. Bringing the Suresh case back to readers’ attention is essential because it raises
many questions on how refugee law and protection against torture relate to each other
and what position they hold in face of rising security concerns. This thesis argues that
the Suresh exception was not a helpful legal development to solve security problems,
but a highly troubling decision that unnecessarily undermined important human rights
laws. To establish this, I assess the problematic aspects of the balancing process in
Suresh, the negative example the Suresh exception has set for other cases and the legal
difficulty of basing the Suresh exception on the existence of a danger to national
security, as this is a term which lacks clear definition in international law.
For the purpose of this analysis, I adopt a positivist approach. Although one may at
times wish for a law that is objective, clear, and free from external influence, I utilize
the positivist approach with an understanding that in reality law is never independent
from politics.3 All norms result from political choices. However, there is value in
relying on norms established and crystalized through decades of debate and
adjudication, such as the absolute prohibition of torture. Such norms have a long history
of confirmation and support by legal scholars and jurisprudence and have withstood
the test of changeable political circumstances. In comparison, recent legal
developments that prioritize security interests, such as the Suresh exception, are an
immediate and ill-advised answer to threat of terrorism, and are knee-jerk band-aid
solutions that can contribute to exacerbating security problems in the long term. These

3

Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 1 EUR. J. INT’L L. 4, 9 (1990).
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norms of the post-9/11 era should not supersede carefully considered, evolved, and
long-standing norms such as non-refoulement and the absolute prohibition of torture.
I begin with a background on the prohibition of refoulement to torture in international
law and a summary of the Suresh case history in chapter II. Chapter III deals with the
erosion of the absolute prohibition of torture through the Suresh exception. It shows
how the Canadian Supreme Court endorsed Canada’s violation of its obligations under
international law by ignoring the absolute character of the prohibition against torture.
It illustrates the negative impact the Suresh decision has had on other cases by
providing states with an argument and precedent to prioritize security interests over the
human right to be protected from torture. I contextualize the Suresh decision alongside
other security measures targeting migrants, looking particularly at the proliferation of
extraordinary rendition as an example of such measures getting out of hand. Here,
states did not rely on measures bordering on the illegal but actually crossed the line by
violating the prohibition of torture, as the Canadian Supreme Court did in Suresh.
Chapter IV is dedicated to the difficulty of determining who constitutes a security
threat. The first sub-section discusses the lack of a clear definition of terrorism in
international law and how Suresh tried to define domestically what constitutes a danger
against national security. The second sub-section analyzes the problematic attempt to
expand the scope of threat to include even indirect risks. And lastly the chapter
elaborates the question of what degree of association with a terroristic organization,
without direct participation in an act of terror, is sufficient to declare somebody a
danger to national security. Finally, chapter V suggests alternative ways of protecting
security interests without exposing an individual to the risk of torture, such as domestic
prosecution and possible imprisonment if found guilty of terrorism-related charges.

3

II. Background
Before discussing the legal arguments in the Suresh decision, I begin with some general
background. In this chapter, I first introduce the concept of non-refoulement and its
underlying legal framework in international law. Then I focus on the history of the
Suresh decision itself: who is Suresh, how did the case arrive at the Canadian Supreme
Court, which issues the Court concerned itself with, and how it was influenced by the
political events occurring during the time of the judges’ deliberations.
A. International Legal Framework of Non-Refoulement
1. Non-Refoulement in the Refugee Convention 1951
After the Second World War, Europe faced an immense number of displaced persons.
Those who could not be repatriated were resettled through the International Refugee
Organization (IRO). From 1947 until 1951, its program transferred over 1 million
European refugees to North America, Israel, South Africa or Oceania. However, the
mandate of the IRO was set to end in June 1950 and the international community had
to come up with a different solution for how to deal with the remaining war refugees.4
On 8 August 1949, the United Nations Economic and Social Council passed Resolution
248 (IX) to create the “Ad Hoc Committee on Statelessness and Related Problems”,5
whose mandate was to prepare a draft Convention on the Status of Refugees and
Stateless Individuals. This draft Convention was later discussed in the conference of
plenipotentiaries in July 1951 and resulted in the adoption of the Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees,6 which entered into force on 22 April 1954.7 The Refugee
Convention introduces the definition of a refugee to determine who may enjoy the
protection of the Convention and outlines the refugee’s rights and obligations. But for
the purposes of this thesis, only the articles related to non-refoulement are relevant, as

4

JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2005).
ECOSOC Res. 248 (IX), ESCOR, 4th year, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/1553 (Aug. 8 1949).
6
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, entered into
force April 22, 1954. [Hereinafter, Refugee Convention]
7
Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-refoulement,
in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 78, para. 30 (2003).
5
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they outline the non-refoulement protection and the exceptional circumstances under
which a refugee may be expelled for security reasons.
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention is the main legal source for the prohibition of
refoulement in international refugee law. It reads:
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in
any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.
This article protects refugees, as well as asylum seekers before they completed the
refugee determination status,8 and creates several obligations for States Parties. First,
states are not allowed to directly refoule somebody to a country where s/he might face
a threat to his/her life or freedom. But in addition to this, states are obliged to refrain
from all measures that would amount to indirect refoulement. For example, refusing
entry to asylum seekers at the border, inciting non-state actors to force out refugees
back to their home countries, or to coercing refugees and asylum seekers into accepting
seemingly “voluntary” repatriation.9 Also, when a state transfers a refugee or asylum
seeker to a different country, based on a bilateral or multilateral agreement for instance,
it is still responsible for any foreseeable consequences the person in question faces in
this other jurisdiction. This was established by the European Court of Human Rights in
its decision TI v. United Kingdom,10 as well as in Soering v United Kingdom.11 In these
cases, the UK planned to return asylum seekers to Germany under the Dublin
Convention,12 which establishes that the first country within the European Union the
asylum seeker arrived to is responsible for the refugee status determination. At the time,
Germany offered protection only from persecution by state actors, while the UK

8

Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 161.
HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 317-318.
10
T.I. v. The United Kingdom, Eur.Ct.H.R. (2002).
11
Soering v. The United Kingdom, Eur.Ct.H.R. (1989).
12
Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one
of the Member States of the European Communities - Dublin Convention, EU Regulation 97/C 254/01,
1997 O.J. (C 254). Article 8 reads: “Where no Member State responsible for examining the application
for asylum can be designated on the basis of the other criteria listed in this Convention, the first
Member State with which the application for asylum is lodged shall be responsible for examining it.”
Replaced in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation (Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003, O.J. (L 50) and
in 2013 by the Dublin III Regulation (Council Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013, O.J. (L 180).
9
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already followed the nowadays-accepted standard of granting asylum when the
persecution was carried out by non-state actors. As a consequence, Germany would
had denied refugee status to the individuals in question and deported them. The Court
clarified that the UK would be responsible for indirect refoulement if Germany refouled
them to their country of origin. Thus, the state must not transfer these refugees to
Germany.13 The same was confirmed by the House of Lords decision R v. Secretary of
State for the Home Department; Ex parte Adan.14
The prohibition of refoulement does not only apply when the refugee will face a threat
to life and freedom. Through different Conventions the content has expanded to include
more situations. For example, non-refoulement applies to facing a risk of torture upon
return through the Convention against Torture15, or a risk from persecution for political
opinions or religious beliefs during times of armed conflict under the Fourth Geneva
Convention.16 I discuss these additional aspects to non-refoulement, that go beyond
what the Refugee Convention protects, in the following sub- chapters.
Originally the Ad hoc Committee that drafted the Refugee Convention did not envision
an exception to the prohibition of refoulement but regarded it as an absolute right.17 By
the time the Convention was being adopted, this stance had significantly changed. The
non-refoulement provision still held a place of special importance, as Article 42(1) of
the Convention forbids States Parties to make any reservations to this Article.
Nonetheless, a second paragraph was added to Article 33 introducing an exception
based on security reasons:
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a
danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having
been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime,
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.

JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 36-37 (2nd ed. 2014).
R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; Ex parte Adan, [2001] 2 A.C. 477 (H.L.), Dec. 19,
2000 (UK).
15
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 4
February 1985,1465 U.N.T.S. 85, entered into force June 26, 1987. [hereinafter, CAT]
16
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (4th Geneva
Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
17
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (3rd ed.
2007).
13
14
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This security exception is the main idea the Suresh decision is based on. Usually a state
is not allowed to deport an individual after s/he was granted protection as a refugee.
But Article 33(2) theoretically enables it to disregard the prohibition of refoulement
and remove refugees that pose a security threat.
Another important provision is the exclusion clause of Article 1F of the Refugee
Convention. It is relevant in this context, as it also closely relates to issues of national
security and danger to the community and is used in cases similar to the ones dealing
with Article 33(2). However, it differs from the previously discussed article in an
essential aspect. While Article 33(2) applies to people that were granted refugee status
and fell under the protection of the Refugee Convention, Article 1F excludes
individuals from receiving protection under the Convention altogether. Article 1F
reads:
The provisions of this Convention shall not apply to any person with
respect to whom there are serious reasons for considering that:
a) he has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime
against humanity, as defined in the international instruments drawn
up to make provision in respect of such crimes;
b) he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country
of refuge prior to his admission to that country as a refugee;
c) he has been guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.
In applying these two articles, states often wrongly blend this provision with the one
of Article 33(2) and exclude asylum seekers for security reasons based on Article
1(F).18 This conduct has two reasons. Firstly, from the point of view of states it is a
benefit to deny protection peremptory without entering the detailed requirements of
refugee status determination. Secondly, there is a part in the UNHCR handbook that
creates confusion on this point when it says “the aim of this exclusion clause is to
protect the community of a receiving country from the danger of admitting a refugee
who has committed a serious common crime”.19

18

James C. Hathaway & Colin J. Harvey, Framing Refugee Protection in the New World Disorder, 34
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 257, 260 (2001).
19
HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 539.
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However, the purpose of the exclusion clauses is actually not to protect a state’s
security interests, but to exclude those unworthy of the protection of the Refugee
Convention.20 Many of the highest courts of states such as Canada, the US, and the UK
have confirmed this approach.21 According to Pushpanathan,22 the purpose of 1(F) “is
not the protection of the society of refuge from dangerous refugees”, for this Article
33(2) would be applied. “Rather, it is to exclude ab initio those who are not bona fide
refugees.”23 The same reasoning was followed by the European Court of Justice in
Bundesrepublik CJEU 2010,24 where the Court stated that 1F(b) is not related to state
security concerns.25 The foundation for this understanding can be found in the
Convention’s travaux préparatoires. According to them, state representatives had
mainly two aspects in mind while creating Article 1F. One being to avoid the sheltering
of criminals who could not be tried in the state of refuge, the other concerning the
compliance with certain extradition obligations. By including the exclusion clause in
the Convention, states would not be compelled to grant refuge to a person who should
be extradited according to a different treaty.26 Thus, it is clear that UNHCR’s view that
Article 1F serves the security interests of the States Parties is not legally sound.
Due to the similarity to Article 1F (b), it seems logical that Article 33(2) was intended
to cover different situations, otherwise the provision would be redundant. While the
exclusion clause refers to crimes committed before receiving refugee status outside the
country of refuge, the non-refoulement exception gives no reference to where and when
the crime must have taken place. It is argued that it covers crimes committed either in
the country of refuge or in another state, but after refugee status was awarded to the
individual.27 In comparison to Article 1F of the Convention, the exception for nonrefoulement in Article 33(2) includes a higher threshold because they require the

20

Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 18, at 259.
Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 18, at 260-261.
22
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982 (Can.
S.C.C.).
23
HATHAWAY, supra note 4, at 349.
24
Case C-57/09 and C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D, 2010 E.C.R. I-10979.
25
HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 13, at 540.
26
Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 18, at 278.
27
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 148.
21
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presence of danger to the security or community. Thus, there needs to be an evaluation
of a future threat as an additional element.28
These differences between the two legal provisions have to be taken into account
during their application, so as not to confuse them. If we consider the Refugee
Convention alone (for the moment, we will not consider the Convention against Torture
or customary international law), then both Article 33 and Article 1F can allow
refoulement to torture: Article 33(2) because it allows an exception to non-refoulement,
and Article 1F because the Refugee Convention excludes certain individuals who then
cannot enjoy protection under Article 33 in the first place. However, Article 33(2) is
more relevant for this thesis, as its wording includes an assessment of security interests,
and balancing those against the negative consequences of refoulement to torture is what
makes the Suresh decision so troublesome.
There is the question whether non-refoulement has become a norm of customary
international law and would therefore give protection to individuals even when the
Refugee Convention does not apply to them. Two elements have to be fulfilled for a
norm to count as customary law: state practice and opinio iuris. State practice refers to
the actual behavior of states while the opinio iuris relates to the “subjective belief” of
states that their behavior is in correspondence with the law.29 The International Court
of Justice specified the element of state practice on numerous occasions. For example,
in the Asylum case30 it established that state practice should be constant and uniform,31
while in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases32 it elaborated that state practice needs
to be “both extensive and virtually uniform.”33 However, it is important to note that in
Nicaragua34 the Court clarified that state practice does not need to be perfect. For a
rule to be established as customary law it is sufficient “that the conduct of States should,
in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances of State conduct

28

Id. at para. 147.
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (5th ed. 2003).
30
Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266 (November 1950).
31
SHAW, supra note 29, at 72.
32
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany v. Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (February 1969). [hereinafter, North Sea Continental Shelf]
33
SHAW, supra note 29, at 73.
34
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 1986). [hereinafter, Nicaragua]
29
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inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that
rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule.”35
The second element, the opinio iuris, can be found in the “verbal statements of
government representatives to international organisations, in the content of UNGA
resolutions, declarations and other normative instruments adopted by such
organisations, and in the consent of states to such instruments”.36 This was clearly
mentioned in the Nicaragua case where the Court states that the subjective element of
customary international law can be “deduced from, inter alia, the attitude of the Parties
and the attitude of States towards certain General Assembly resolutions”, in particular
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States for instance.37 It is also important to note that the
codification of a rule or its embodiment in multilateral conventions “does not mean that
they cease to exist and to apply as principles of customary law”.38 Therefore, it is
possible that a rule of customary law exists also as a rule of international treaty law.39
As established in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, a conventional rule can pass
into “the general corpus of international law” and become binding for all states as a
norm of customary international law.40 For this, three elements need to be fulfilled
according to the Court. Firstly, the conventional rule needs to be of fundamentally
norm-creating character.41 Secondly, “even without the passage of any considerable
period of time, a very widespread and representative participation in the convention
might suffice” if it includes those states whose interests are especially affected.42 And
thirdly, state practice in accordance with the conventional rule has to be “extensive and

35

Nicaragua, supra note 34, at para. 186.
BIRGIT SCHLÜTTER, DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THEORY AND THE
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL AD HOC CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS FOR RWANDA AND YUGOSLAVIA 153 (2010).
37
Nicaragua, supra note 34, at para. 188. Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). [hereinafter, Friendly
Relations Declaration]
38
Id. at para. 174.
39
Id. at para. 177.
40
North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 32, at para. 71.
41
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 200.
42
North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 32, at para 73.
36
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virtually uniform" and "show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal obligation
is involved”.43
With regards to the non-refoulement provision of the Refugee Convention the majority
of scholars see these requirements for a conventional rule to pass into customary law
as fulfilled.44 The non-refoulement provisions in the Refugee Convention and other
international instruments are of norm-creating character, which has been confirmed by
various declarations adopted by the UN General Assembly or by statements of the
Council of Europe, for instance.45 Also the second element of widespread and
representative state support is fulfilled, as the extent of participation in treaties with
non-refoulement provisions shows an almost universal acceptance of this principle.46
For example, the Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol47 were ratified by 148
states.48 Lauterpacht and Bethlehem conducted a comprehensive study on this aspect
and also included states that did not sign the Refugee Convention but are parties to
other (regional) treaties including a prohibition of refoulement. They came to the
conclusion that about 90% of the UN member states have thus accepted norms of nonrefoulement.49 The third element of consistent practice and general recognition of the
rule is for one part fulfilled through the above mentioned near universal participation
by states in treaties including non-refoulement provisions. However, this alone would
not be enough. A further evidence for general recognition can be found in the high
number of states who have internalized non-refoulement into their domestic legal
order.50 In addition, the States Parties to the Refugee Convention explicitly declared
in 2001 that the non-refoulement provision is to be considered a norm of customary

43

Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 200.
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 17, at 354.
45
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 203.
46
Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 209.
47
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into
force Oct. 4, 1967.
48
See UNHCR record of state parties as of April 2015:
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international law.51 All these elements combined show that non-refoulement has indeed
become to a norm of customary international law.52 The more difficult part is to identify
what exactly is the content of this customary rule. Most of the time, states, courts,
international organizations, and scholars refer to non-refoulement as it is understood in
the Refugee Convention, as a prohibition of return to any territory that poses a threat
to life or freedom. However, this scope of protection has been extended to include the
risk of torture, due to the customary character of the non-refoulement provision in the
Convention against Torture (see chapter III.A.2). Whether customary law also prohibits
refoulement to a place where the individual might face cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment still leaves some room for debate.53
2. Non-Refoulement in the Convention Against Torture
In December 1984, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (hereinafter
abbreviated CAT)54 that is aimed at improving the protection against torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.55 It not only established obligations for the
States Parties, but also creates rights for individuals,56 for instance in the area of nonrefoulement which can be found in Article 3 of the Convention:
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person
to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds,
the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant
considerations including, where applicable, the existence in the State
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concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations
of human rights.57
Article 3 applies to individuals under the control of a State Party, be it within its
territory or outside.58 Substantially it only encompasses those under the threat of
torture, while acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment do not trigger protection.
With accordance to the definition of torture in Article 1 of the CAT, the protection from
refoulement applies to conduct that causes severe mental or physical pain or suffering,
that was inflicted intentionally for purposes that relate to the interests of the state.
Therefore, there needs to be a certain involvement from state authorities or at least
acquiescence through refraining from preventing the act.59 In addition, the risk of being
subjected to torture must be based on substantive grounds.60 This means the personal
risk of torture has to be found to extend “beyond mere theory or suspicion”61 but the
threat does not need to be “highly likely to occur”.62 This makes the burden of proof
for the individual less strict than according to other human rights treaties like the
European Convention on Human Rights,63 for instance, where the test of high
probability needs to be fulfilled.64 Furthermore, the general human rights situation in
the country of origin has to be considered too65 which can give extra support to the
individual’s claim that s/he will face torture after refoulement.
The prohibition of refoulement in the CAT is a powerful regulation for two reasons.
Firstly, it is not open to any exceptions or derogations out of national security reasons
or other public emergencies, which makes it an absolute provision.66 Secondly,
individuals have the possibility to lodge complaints with the Committee against Torture
when their rights based on Article 3 are being infringed by a state. This Committee was
established by Article 17 of the CAT as an independent institution within the United
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Nations, with the task to interpret the Convention.67 However, it is only possible to
bring a case before it when the concerned state has accepted the Committee’s
competence in this area.68 Also its decisions are not binding on the States Parties, they
are only recommendations. Nevertheless, they are an essential source for finding
authoritative interpretations of the non-refoulement provision of the CAT,69 and the
negative publicity of being found in violation with the CAT can persuade states to
comply with the Committee’s decision.
3. Non-Refoulement in Other International Treaties
Besides the Refugee Convention and the CAT, there are other international treaties that
incorporate provisions of non-refoulement. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights70 includes a provision in Article 7 that not only prohibits torture but
also cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. Although there is no
specific mentioning of refoulement, this article has been interpreted as including a duty
not to deport anyone to a country where s/he would face this kind of treatment.71 The
Fourth Geneva Convention 194972 establishes in its Article 45 a prohibition of
transferring a person to a country “where he or she may have reason to fear persecution
for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs” during armed conflict.73 In
addition, many regional agreements such as the OAU Refugee Convention,74 the
American Convention on Human Rights,75 and the African Charter of Human and
Peoples’ Rights,76 also contain forms of non-refoulement.77 For the purpose of this
thesis it is not necessary to discuss all these legal instruments in detail as the most
significant legal sources on an international level are the Refugee Convention and the
67
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CAT. However, there is one more regional treaty that is useful for this thesis: the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).78
The ECHR plays a significant role in the protection from refoulement due to its binding
character for the European states that signed it and the extensive jurisprudence that was
rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on this topic. Decisions by
the ECtHR are of high importance as they are binding on the parties to the dispute, and
also constitute precedents.79 Individuals are able to lodge a complaint with the Court
whenever they find their rights guaranteed by the ECHR infringed.80 This is a huge
advantage over courts that are only open to petitions by states, as it improves access to
legal remedies and makes states more likely to comply with their obligations.
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights reads: “No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”81 In itself,
this provision does not directly mention the issue of refoulement, however landmark
cases by the ECtHR confirmed that this rule encompasses the extradition or deportation
of individuals. Therefore, sending them to a state where they would face any of the
described treatment, would constitute a breach of Article 3.82 This prohibition of torture
and degrading treatment is of absolute character. Many other articles of the ECHR
allow for exceptions out of national security reasons, morals or public health. Article 3
does not include such exceptions.83 The Convention even goes one step further by
explicitly forbidding any derogations to this article even “in times of war or other public
emergencies threatening the life of the nation”.84 This has been confirmed by the
ECtHR, therefore states cannot justify the use of torture, nor the refoulement to it, based
on security issues such as counter-terrorism.85
This overview of the legal framework of non-refoulement has illustrated the three most
relevant laws, all of them slightly different. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention as a
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prohibition that leaves room for security exceptions, Article 3 of the CAT as an
absolute prohibition of refoulement to torture, and Article 3 of the ECHR as a very
strong legal norm with the ECtHR to enforce it, but with only limited regional
application. In the next section, I introduce the Suresh decision, to pave the way for
subsequent chapters that will consider the arguments judges used for assessing the
prohibition of refoulement to torture.
B. The Suresh Case History
In 2002, the Canadian Supreme Court heard the case of Manickavasagam Suresh from
Sri Lanka. He fled his home country and came to Canada in 1990 as an asylum seeker
claiming persecution due to being of Tamil descent. In April 1991, he was accepted as
a refugee. In the summer of the same year, he applied for immigrant status but did not
complete the process, because the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and the
Solicitor General of Canada initiated deportation proceedings against him based on
security grounds.86
In 1995, a security certificate was issued under section 40.1 of the Canadian
Immigration Act that identified Suresh as a threat to Canada, and declared him
inadmissible to the country.87 The certificate stated that he is a member of the LTTE,88
which supports violent Tamil uprisings in Sri Lanka. Based on findings of the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), this group was involved in terrorist activities
against the democratically elected government of Sri Lanka.89 Suresh was detained in
October of the same year when the security certificate was submitted to the Federal
Court of Canada to be examined on its reasonableness.90 Two years later Judge
Teitelbaum upheld the security certificate and confirmed that Suresh was a member of
the LTTE and that it is reasonable to believe this organization was involved in terrorist
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acts. However, he also stated that Sri Lanka mistreats Tamils they arrest to an extent
that might amount to torture.91
The deportation process followed and in 1997 the Minister issued an opinion declaring
Suresh a danger to Canadian security. According to Canadian legislation, the Minister
was allowed to deport Suresh for security reasons, even if his “life or freedom” would
be threatened upon return.92 The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed the decision to
deport Suresh and claimed that a state’s right to expel individuals for security concerns
overrides the international law to be free from torture.93 The Court referred to the
Refugee Convention as providing exceptions to the prohibition of refoulement and
explained that domestic Canadian law also allows for derogations based on certain
security reasons.94
Afterwards, Suresh appealed to the Canadian Supreme Court, which decided to deal
with four issues in its deliberations: It examined whether the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms95 forbids refoulement of refugees to places they might face torture
and death. Secondly, it looked at whether it is a violation of the rights of free expression
and association if the deportation is merely based on the membership to a terrorist
organization. Thirdly, it asked whether the terms “terrorism” and “danger to the
security to Canada” are too vague; and lastly, whether there are sufficient procedural
safeguards in the deportation process.96 Ultimately, the Court decided in favor of
Suresh based on procedural irregularities and ordered a new deportation hearing.
However, what made the decision so controversial and what makes it the subject of this
thesis, is the Court’s arguments on the balancing between security interests and
refoulement to torture. It claims that deporting a refugee to a place where s/he will not
only face persecution but specifically torture is possible under certain circumstances.
This has since been referred to as the Suresh exception. I argue that the Suresh
exception entails violations of Canada’s obligations under international law and
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numerous other problematic legal issues that will be discussed in detail in the following
chapters.
When analyzing the Suresh case, it is essential to keep in mind that this decision was
rendered during a politically highly sensitive time. The proceedings that started against
Suresh in 1995 were prolonged until the turn of the millennium. While the judges of
the Supreme Court deliberated on their decision, the attacks of 9/11 happened and
changed the way states approached security threats. In a response to the now
promulgated ‘War on Terror’, the US passed the US Patriot Act,97 the UK introduced
the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 200198 and Canada issued its AntiTerrorism Act.99 Many other states followed this example and enacted legislation that
authorize the curtailing of personal rights for the sake of security protection. The Suresh
case indicates that the judiciary did not remain unaffected by these policy changes but
was influenced by them in its decision making. For Suresh himself, these new Acts
could not apply retroactively, but the Supreme Court openly refers to this political
context in its judgement, for example when analyzing the threat Suresh’s membership
in the LTTE poses for Canada: “International conventions must be interpreted in the
light of current conditions. It may once have made sense to suggest that terrorism in
one country did not necessarily implicate other countries. But after the year 2001, that
approach is no longer valid.”100
Another evidence that Suresh was influenced by the political circumstances at that
time, is the reference to the House of Lords decision Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. Rehman101 which stated: “They [the events of 9/11] are a reminder that
in matters of national security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to
underline the need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of
97
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ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist activities in a
foreign country constitutes a threat to national security.”102 This statement implies that
the House of Lords, as well as the Canadian Supreme Court, see it as necessary in times
of security threats that the judiciary subordinates itself under the governmental
decisions on this matter. This is a worrying approach that endangers the impartiality
and independence of the judiciary and can lead to the erosion of fundamental human
rights, such as the prohibition of torture, at a time when the opposite is needed, as
argued in the next chapter.
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III. Erosion of the Absolute Prohibition of Torture
A. Violating Obligations Under International Law
In Suresh, the Canadian Supreme Court revisited the old question of how far a state
may go in protecting its security interests and specifically dealt with whether
refoulement to torture is a valid security measure. It had been long-established that the
prohibition of torture is an absolute human right in international law that states must
never violate. However, scholars such as Upendra Baxi observe that the terror attacks
of 9/11 formed a turning point in international law. States reacted to this ‘War on
Terror’ by introducing stricter domestic security measures and by initiating military
operations such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. This made it necessary to reevaluate
understanding of various international legal concepts to determine whether acts to
combat the threat from global terrorism as part of the ‘War on Terror’ were within the
borders of legality.103 It is in this context that the Supreme Court had to decide on the
legality of Suresh’s possible refoulement to torture under the security certificate.
1. Balancing Security Interests against Refoulement to Torture
At the beginning of the Suresh judgment, we find a passage explaining the core
dilemma grappled with in the decision. The Court takes into account all the external
influences that have to be considered and need to be balanced against each other. On
the one side, it acknowledges the role the fight against terrorism plays in governments’
policies and how high the price can be if security threats are not dealt with properly:
The issues engage concerns and values fundamental to Canada and
indeed the world. On the one hand stands the manifest evil of
terrorism and the random and arbitrary taking of innocent lives,
rippling out in an ever-widening spiral of loss and fear.
Governments, expressing the will of the governed, need the legal
tools to effectively meet this challenge.104
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In the following paragraph, it mentions the constitutional values and international
instruments that function as limitation to security policies and are supposed to make
sure fundamental human rights will not be infringed:
On the other hand stands the need to ensure that those legal tools do
not undermine values that are fundamental to our democratic society
– liberty, the rule of law, and the principles of fundamental justice –
values that lie at the heart of the Canadian constitutional order and
the international instruments that Canada has signed. (…) [I]t would
be a Pyrrhic victory if terrorism were defeated at the cost of
sacrificing our commitment to those values.105
This describes the Court’s dilemma but in the end the Court did sacrifice its
commitment to the value of fundamental justice in its reasoning and prioritized
protecting Canada’s security interests over their obligations under international law.
As a first step, the Court dealt with two conflicting laws within domestic Canadian
legislation. According to Section 53(1) b of the Canadian Immigration Act,106 the
Minister of Immigration had declared Suresh to be a risk to Canada’s security.
Consequently, she had used her right to issue a deportation order on these grounds
which make it possible to expel a refugee even if his life or freedom would be at risk
upon return.107 Opposing this provision, Section 7 of the Canadian Charter states:
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”108 It
was the task of the Supreme Court to solve this conflict of laws.
The Canadian Charter applies to everyone. That means refugees are included in its
protection. However, this protection is not absolute and is subject to exceptions. The
requirement for a deviation from the rights to life, liberty and security is that the
conduct has to be in accordance with fundamental justice. To determine what fulfills
this condition, the Court relied on a process of balancing.109 The main factors that are
to be examined according to the Court in cases of refoulement to torture are “the
conditions of the potential deportee, the danger that the deportee presents to Canadians
105
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or the country’s security, and the threat of terrorism to Canada.”110 The Supreme Court
itself admitted that the balance might not be decided uniformly in every similar case.
Often the same general considerations are taken into account when finding a balance,
however the specific circumstances around the respective refugee can tip the scale
differently.111 The most important aspect when deciding whether deportation to torture
is an adequate response to fight the security threat, is for the deportation to be consistent
with the principle of fundamental justice. However, the term fundamental justice lacks
a clear definition. In attempts to identify what constitutes a violation of it, Canadian
courts, including the Supreme Court, resorted to describing it as an act that would
“shock the Canadian conscience”.112 To understand how the Supreme Court performs
this test of what shocks the Canadian conscience, it is best to look at two decisions
rendered before Suresh.
Kindler113 and Burns114 are both cases that dealt with the extradition of individuals to
the United States where they might face the death penalty. This is a valid legal sanction
in the US but at that time Canadian criminal law no longer allowed for it. Therefore,
the Court had to consider the scope of the right to life in the Canadian Charter and
whether extradition to a life sentence would violate it. In Kindler, the appellant had
been convicted of first degree murder in the US but fled to Canada. When he was
captured there, the Minister of Justice decided to extradite Kindler despite the fact that
he would face the death penalty. In 1991, it came upon the Canadian Supreme Court to
decide whether this would be a violation of fundamental justice. It took into
consideration that the death penalty had been abolished in Canada, except in some
military cases, but the public was torn on the issue. Also, there was no clear
international position against the death penalty, only a trend towards its abolishment,
and Canada should not become a safe haven for fugitives from prosecution. And lastly,
the Court observed that the US followed detailed due process regulations. All these
arguments were considered in the balancing process and finally tipped the scale to the
detriment of Kindler. The Supreme Court decided that returning the appellant to the
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US, even without seeking a diplomatic assurance that the death penalty would not be
applied, would not shock the Canadian conscience and was thus in line with the
requirement of fundamental justice.115
Ten years later Burns dealt with the extradition of two Canadian citizens, Sebastian
Burns and Atif Rafay, who were wanted by the US police for the murder of Rafay’s
family. After the crime, they had fled to Canada and were arrested in British
Columbia.116 The Minster of Justice wanted to extradite the fugitives, but in case of a
conviction in the US they would face the death penalty. The case was brought before
the Canadian Supreme Court to decide whether extradition would be in violation of the
right to life in the Canadian Charter. The Court examined the same factors as in Kindler
but came to a different result. This time it concluded that the Canadian conscience
regards the death penalty as unjust and that Canada had supported initiatives to abolish
capital punishment worldwide.117 The Court admitted that it cannot go as far as
claiming that an international law against the death penalty exists, but at least there is
a movement towards regarding the abolition of it as a principle of fundamental justice
also on an international level.118 Eventually, the decision stated that extraditing Burns
and Rafay without asking for the assurance from the US that the death penalty will not
apply, was found to be in violation of fundamental justice.119 Thus, the balance tilted
in favor of the appellants this time. It is important to note that the Court did not
absolutely decide against extradition to death penalty. Instead it left room open for an
exception under specific circumstances. The extradition has to serve a pressing and
substantial purpose, this purpose has to be likely achieved through the extradition and
not go further than necessary, and the risk of death penalty does not outweigh the
importance of this purpose.120
Looking at the changes that happened from Kindler until the decision of Burns, we can
observe a trend to forbidding extradition if it infringes the right to life. In Suresh, the
Court referred to these previous decisions and affirmed that death penalty was
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abolished in Canada in 1998 and had not been executed since the early 1960s because
it is regarded as a violation to the right of life. Also, it stated that with regards to
domestic law, Canada clearly rejects torture as it is forbidden under the Criminal
Code.121 This opposition to the use of death penalty or torture is a view that has been
maintained over a long period of time and remained constant despite changes in
governments and their policies. It reflects where the Canadian public opinion sees the
limits of their state’s criminal justice system.122 Therefore the Court did come to the
conclusion that torture is seen as fundamentally unjust and refouling somebody to
torture would shock the Canadian conscience.123 In addition, the Supreme Court in
Suresh disagreed with the Court of Appeal’s claim that by deporting a refugee to the
risk of torture, Canada would only be an “involuntary intermediary”.124 Instead it
emphasized that it would still constitute a breach of fundamental justice if a different
state carried out the act of torture after the refoulement.125
So far, the reasoning of the Court is logical. Deciding that refouling somebody to
torture would be against the Canadian conscience and that Canada cannot escape its
responsibility by claiming it is not the one carrying out the torture, is in accordance
with Canada’s international law obligations. But then the Court went on to establish an
exception when refoulement to torture would not be a violation of fundamental justice.
It stated that its decision does not mean Canada may never deport a refugee to a country
he/she would face fundamentally unjust treatment. Under certain exceptional
circumstances it is possible to expel an individual to torture. Namely when the
balancing approach ends in favor of Canada’s interest to protect public security by not
becoming a safe haven for terrorists.126 This is what has come to be known as the Suresh
exception.
Balancing approaches might be helpful whenever it is necessary to weigh opposing
interests against each other, but when it comes to absolute rights as the prohibition of
torture, there is no room for balancing. This opinion is shared by Hathaway and
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Harvey127 who add that a balancing test might open up a loophole for states to interpret
relatively small problems as a major security threat, which should not be sufficient to
expel a refugee to where her or his life or freedom would be threatened.128 Lauterpacht
and Bethlehem agree to this but introduce an additional differentiation. They concur
that in cases where the individual would face a risk of torture upon return, the
prohibition of refoulement is absolute.129 But with regards to other threats, they do not
rule out the usage of the described balancing test. Thus, there is consent among scholars
that in a situation like for Suresh, where he would face the risk of torture upon return
to Sri Lanka, security exceptions to non-refoulement should not apply. The Suresh
exception violates a peremptory norm of international law, as explained in the
following section.
2. Denying the ius cogens Character of the Prohibition of Torture
The previous debate solely focused on Canadian law but Canada’s obligations under
international law by being State Party to the Refugee Convention and the CAT cannot
be ignored. In Suresh, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the balancing approach
concerning fundamental justice is not limited to Canadian domestic law, but also
includes the state’s international human rights obligations, which can be found in
conventions, customary norms, and decisions of international tribunals.130 According
to the CAT, the prohibition of refoulement to torture is absolute and therefore Canada
is not allowed to consider exceptions to it under special security circumstances.
Sending somebody to torture is a red line that states long ago have agreed not to cross.
When Amnesty International intervened as a third party in Suresh, they brought up
exactly this argument and emphasized that the prohibition of torture is a norm of ius
cogens.131 According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,132
ius cogens is a norm that is “accepted and recognized by the international community
of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can
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be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”133
It is difficult to pinpoint when a norm has actually reached this general acceptance by
the international community. The Court in Suresh suggests three indicia to determine
that the prohibition of torture is ius cogens. Firstly, the large number of ratifications of
international treaties that include a prohibition of torture are a sign that the majority of
states condemn this practice.134 For example, most states have ratified the Geneva
Conventions, the CAT and the ICCPR and voted in favor of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.135 Secondly, states never officially endorse torture as a legitimate
state practice.136 Even if they resort to acts of torture, it is always done in secrecy and
no state would publicly admit to rightfully using it. And lastly, international scholars
and international tribunals have confirmed the peremptory character of the norm, such
as the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Furundzija137 for instance.138 Despite all these indications
in favor of the absolute prohibition of torture being ius cogens, the Court does not
deliver a clear conclusion on it. Rather it merely recognizes that it is a norm that “cannot
be easily derogated from”.139
In the end, the Canadian Supreme Court came to the result that “international law
rejects deportation to torture, even where national security interests are at stake.”140
However, it also regarded international law as not binding in Canada unless the specific
norms were “incorporated into Canadian law by enactment”.141 For Suresh it only
looked at the domestic criteria of fundamental justice and used international norms as
a way to interpret Canadian constitutional law, not as binding provisions.142 In
conclusion, the Court remained of the opinion that deportation to torture is allowed in
exceptional circumstances. It is not clear on what basis it decided to ignore its
133
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international legal obligations when in previous decisions such as Kindler
developments in international law were important for guiding the Court in its view on
the death penalty.
There are several flaws in the decision of the Court with regards to not applying the
relevant international law provisions. Canada signed the CAT on 23 August 1985 and
ratified it on 24 June 1987.143 Therefore, Canada is bound to the absolute prohibition
of torture stipulated in Article 3 of the Convention. Art 2(2) CAT emphasizes that “no
exceptional circumstances whatsoever (…) may be invoked as a justification of
torture”, which bars Canada from introducing an exception to refoulement to torture
such as the Suresh exception.144 Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties clearly states that international treaties are “binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith”. 145 In addition, Article 27 forbids States
Parties to use domestic law as an excuse not to perform their obligations under an
international treaty. Thus, there is no justification for Canada to act in violation of the
CAT as it is a party to this treaty. Furthermore, the Court itself listed a number of
reasons and sources confirming that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory norm of
customary international law.146 It is startling that the Court refused to follow its
argument to the end to avoid an explicit statement on the prohibition of torture being
ius cogens. Instead, it evaded the fact that the Suresh exception is illegal under both
international treaty law and customary law. There are many voices in international law
confirming this. For example, Lauterpacht leaves no doubt that from his point of view,
refoulement of a refugee to torture is never allowed, because the national security
exception must not apply to non-derogable human rights like the prohibition of
torture.147 The UN Committee against Torture criticized the Canadian Supreme Court
for failing to recognize this and condemned any balancing against security threats (see
Agiza v Sweden).148 By now also the International Court of Justice has confirmed that
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the prohibition of torture is customary law and a norm of ius cogens.149 This means that
any treaty or act by a state or international organization that violates the prohibition of
torture is automatically void.150 Thus, with creating the Suresh exception, Canada
clearly violated a binding norm of international law. If the issue of refoulement to
torture comes before the Supreme Court again it needs to remedy this violation by
accepting the prohibition of torture in international law.
B. Negative Impact of the Suresh Exception on other Cases
1. The Use of the Suresh Exception in Canada
When the Canadian Supreme Court introduced the idea of exceptional circumstances
that would make it possible to refoule somebody to torture, it maybe did not expect that
this exception would be invoked very often. But unfortunately, the Canadian
government used it in several cases concerning refoulement out of security reasons.151
One examples for this is Dadar v. Canada.152 Mostafa Dadar had taken part in a failed
coup d’état in his home country Iran and was subjected to torture during his detention
by the Iranian authorities. He managed to flee to Pakistan where he was granted refugee
status under the Refugee Convention. Later he travelled on to Canada and became a
permanent resident.153 In 2004, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration found him
to be a danger to the Canadian public as he had been convicted of aggravated assault
against his wife and Canada intended to deport him.154 When the case was referred to
the Federal Court, Dadar claimed that he would face torture upon return to Iran.155 The
Minister countered that even if there were a risk of torture upon the deportation of
Dadar, the case would fall under exceptional circumstances as established in the Suresh
decision and refoulement to torture would be justified.156 The Court affirmed the
Ministry’s opinion that the danger Dadar poses to the Canadian public would outweigh
149
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the personal risks he faces in Iran.157 But it also came to the conclusion that the
appellant cannot provide sufficient evidence that he would be subjected to torture upon
return in Iran.158
It is highly troubling that once again the Canadian government was willing to ignore
the absolute prohibition of torture (as discussed above) and that it used the Suresh
exception in a case in which the applicant was not suspected of terrorism related
charges. Of course, aggravated assault is a serious crime, but this does not fall under
the requirement of exceptional circumstances as established in Suresh. There, the Court
dealt with cases threatening Canadian security. Assault, on the other hand, is a criminal
offense against an individual that is usually regulated by domestic criminal laws and
procedures in the case of Canadians. It is not exceptional and grave enough to justify
refoulement to torture. Unfortunately, the Court refrained from rendering a decision on
widening the scope of the Suresh exception. Once it found Dadar not to be in danger
of torture, it did not consider it necessary to examine whether exceptional
circumstances exist.159 The Court failed to clearly speak out against the attempt of
extending the Suresh exception from extraordinary national security threats to include
less severe cases of ordinary crimes. Additionally, Canada’s torture assessment might
not have been thorough enough. The Committee against Torture came to the conclusion
that a serious risk would indeed exist for Dadar upon return to Iran and that refouling
him would constitute a breach of Article 3 of the CAT. Nevertheless, Canada ignored
its request for halting the deportation.160
Mahjoub v. Canada161 is a similar case in which the Suresh exception was also raised.
Mohamed Mahjoub is an Egyptian national who was accepted as a Convention refugee
in Canada in 1996.162 In 2000, a security certificate was issued against him for being a
member of a faction of Al Jihad that might engage in terrorism in Egypt.163 Mahjoub
claimed that upon return to Egypt he would be at risk of torture, as he had been tortured
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before for when he was suspected of being a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.164
Once again the government argued that Mahjoub may be refouled nevertheless,
because of the exceptional security circumstances of Suresh. Here, the Court came to
the conclusion that the security evaluation of the Minister was not reasonable and
Mahjoub was not a security risk for Canada.165 Theoretically, this is a good result, as
the Court refrained from using the Suresh exception and interpreted security risk in a
restrictive way to not apply it on Mahjoub. However, it would had been better to have
a clear statement against the validity of the Suresh exception in general to prevent it
from being applied this freely. This can only be achieved if the Supreme Court
overturns the Suresh exception in a future decision. Until this happens, it is reassuring
that at least some Federal Courts try to limit the application of the exception, like in
Mahjoub or also in Jaballah.166
Mahmoud Jaballah is an Egyptian citizen who left his country because of recurring
arrests and mistreatment on the allegation of being a Muslim fundamentalist.167 With
his wife and children he first travelled to Saudi Arabia and then stayed in Pakistan,
Yemen and Azerbaijan before finally arriving in Toronto and applying for refugee
status in Canada.168 During the ongoing procedures for the refugee status
determination, a security certificate was issued against Jaballah. It declared him to be
a member of Al Jihad, a terror organization associated with Al Qaida, and accused him
of having engaged in acts of terrorism.169 The Court confirmed that Jaballah poses a
security risk to Canada but also that he would be at risk of being subjected to torture
upon return to Egypt.170 With regards to the Suresh exception, it decided that the
Supreme Court intended for the exception to be applied only in very few special cases.
It found that as there was no evidence that Jaballah’s case created exceptional
circumstances, it was not legitimate to refoule him to a place he might face torture.171
The Federal Court used a very restrictive interpretation of exceptional circumstances
and curbed the government’s attempt to use Suresh in as many security cases as
164
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possible. It even highlighted that halting the deportation is in compliance with Canada’s
obligations under international law.172
It is a good step in the right direction that, in both these cases, the Federal Court
prevented refoulement to torture from taking place. However, this did not stop the
government from violating the absolute prohibition of torture. The Committee against
Torture criticized Canada on several occasions for its flawed risk assessment and for
ignoring the Committee’s request for a stay of deportation in cases the refugee would
had been refouled to torture.173 This happened for example in Khan v. Canada,174
Dadar v. Canada,175 and Sogi v. Canada.176 The government was outraged whenever
the Committee found Canada guilty of breaching the prohibition of torture. By not
following the interim measures that were ordered by the Committee it wanted to
emphasize that it considers questions of deportation to fall under issues of public
security and their sovereignty and that the suggestion of an international human rights
treaty body may not interfere in these cases.177 It is not worthy of a state such as Canada,
that prides itself in safeguarding human rights, to continue to ignore its international
obligations by leaving the vaguely phrased exception of “exceptional circumstances”
as a loophole for deporting refugees to torture. Instead the Supreme Court should
acknowledge the absolute prohibition of torture as ius cogens and clearly overrule the
exception to refoulement to torture.
2. The Suresh Exception’s Influence on Foreign Jurisdictions
The Suresh exception was also influential in foreign jurisdictions. This brings with it
the danger that, in cases of refoulement, the absolute prohibition of torture might be
eroded on an international scale, instead of just within the domestic jurisdiction of
Canada. The most striking examples can be found in cases before the European Court
of Human Rights where states tried to introduce the Suresh exception. In Saadi v.
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Italy178 in 2008, the European Court of Human Rights dealt with a case where a refugee
was to be deported back to Tunisia after being found guilty of terrorism-related charges.
Saadi claimed that he would face torture upon return. The UK intervened in this trial
as a third party and brought up an argument similar to the Suresh decision. They asked
for a balancing between the security threat a state is confronted with and the seriousness
of the risk of torture the refugee faces which would make it possible to refoule Saadi if
the threat is exceptionally big. Unlike the Canadian Supreme Court, the European Court
of Human Rights did not entertain this suggestion but decided that Article 3 of the
European Human Rights Convention entails an absolute prohibition of refoulement to
torture.179
The European Court of Human Rights based its judgement on its previous decision
Chahal v. United Kingdom180 This landmark case took place in 1996 and established
that refoulement of refugees is not possible in exceptional security circumstances. In
Chahal, the UK wanted to deport an Indian Sikh for his alleged involvement in plans
to assassinate the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi on an official visit to the state.181
Chahal claimed to have a well-founded fear of persecution under the Refugee
Convention,182 while the UK insisted that Article 3 of the ECHR is not absolute but
limited by security grounds which would make refoulement possible even if he faces
the risk of ill-treatment.183 Already back then, before the Suresh decision had been
rendered, the UK suggested to take the degree of ill-treatment into account and balance
it against security interests. “The greater the risk of ill-treatment, the less weight should
be accorded to the threat to national security.”184 However, when there is doubt about
the severity of the ill-treatment the individual will face, then national security should
outweigh it in the balancing approach.185 The Court clearly rejected this and enunciated
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that torture or inhuman or degrading treatment are absolutely forbidden under the
ECHR, irrespective of whether somebody poses a threat to national security.186 The
Court confirmed this position the same year in its decision Ahmed v. Austria.187
Unfortunately, the events of 9/11 gave new impetus to the security exception to nonrefoulement to torture and with the rendering of the Suresh decision it became law.
Now states had a solid example from a Supreme Court that security reasons could
outweigh the absolute prohibition of torture in deportation cases. This explains why the
UK brought it up again in Saadi v. Italy, but unlike the Canadian Supreme Court, the
European Court of Human Rights remained consistent in its jurisprudence. In the
following years, the arguments of the Suresh exception would be used in front of the
European Court of Human Rights several times. It coincided with the political trend of
limiting the inflow of refugees as much as possible and to expel everybody who might
pose a security threat. While implementing new measures and laws to reach this goal,
states suddenly found themselves constrained by human rights provisions and the
existing case law in Europe. In 2005, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia and the UK
intervened in Ramzy v. The Netherlands188 and tried to convince the Court to deviate
from the established Chahal doctrine.189
Mohammed Ramzy is an Algerian national who sought asylum in the Netherlands. His
application was denied and instead he was to be deported on grounds of being involved
in the terrorist activities of an Islamist extremist group. Ramzy took legal action against
the Netherlands at the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that in Algeria he
would be subjected to ill-treatment or torture because of his alleged membership in this
organization.190 Four intervening states argued that in light of international terrorism
and the threat it poses, the Chahal decision needs to be altered.191 Individuals should
not benefit from an absolute protection of Article 3 ECHR if it contradicts the
fundamental rights of the citizens of a state who need to be protected from terrorism.192
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The Court decided not to deliver a final judgement in Ramzy as the applicant failed to
inform his representatives of his whereabouts. The Dutch Intelligence Service reported
that Ramzy had apparently returned to Algeria.193 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court
opposed the suggested modification of the Chahal doctrine because at the same time it
rendered the above discussed judgement in Saadi v. Italy. There, the UK had submitted
the same argument as in Ramzy, and it was rejected.
Four years later in 2012, attempts to undermine the absoluteness of the prohibition of
torture continued. To justify refoulement to torture for security reasons, a new
instrument was used: A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the state the
individual is to be deported to. This is what happened for instance in the Abu Qatada194
case. Omar Mahmoud Othman, known under the name Abu Qatada, left Jordan and
applied for asylum in the United Kingdom in September 1993. He argued that he had
been detained and tortured by Jordanian authorities and was granted refugee status in
June 1994.195 When his original permit to stay expired in 1998, Abu Qatada applied for
permanent leave to remain in the UK. Before this application was decided, he was taken
into custody according to the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001.196 The UK
decided to deport him after agreeing on a MoU with Jordan, guaranteeing he would not
be subjected to torture or ill-treatment there. Abu Qatada appealed against the
deportation order, but in the end the House of Lords upheld the previous Courts’
order.197 The claimant was considered a security risk by the UK because in April 1999
he had been found guilty of conspiracy by a court in Jordan. Allegedly he was part of
a group carrying out bombings on the American School and the Jerusalem Hotel in
Amman a year before and was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment with hard
labor.198 The evidence against Abu Qatada consisted of a confession by a co-defendant
who claimed that he had encouraged the attacks and later congratulated the group for
their success. However, there was proof from medical experts and lawyers during the
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trial that the testifying defendants showed clear signs of torture.199 When Abu Qatada
went before the European Court of Human Rights, he argued that upon his return to
Jordan he would face a retrial with lengthy pre-trial detention and the risk of torture to
force a confession out of him, which would violate Article 3 of the ECHR and Article
6, the right to a fair trial.200 The Court came to the conclusion that the applicant would
be at risk of ill-treatment in Jordan, but the MoU was specific enough to prevent any
ill-treatment from actually taking place.201 Therefore, Article 3 would not be violated
by refouling Abu Qatada.
Obtaining a diplomatic assurance from Jordan is a very controversial idea. States are
inclined to use MoUs to silence the argument the individual might be tortured upon
return but unfortunately these kinds of assurances are not enforceable. They are a mere
promise out of courtesy, not binding contracts. It is also almost impossible to ascertain
whether a state is abiding by the promise not to torture. If a delegation visits the
refouled individual, there is no way of being sure that s/he has not been pressured by
the state of origin to claim that the MoU has been honored, even though in reality
torture took place. Especially in the case of Abu Qatada, it seems ridiculous to obtain
a MoU from Jordan, when a few years previously the applicant received refugee status
because he had been persecuted in that very same state. Also, the case deals with the
torture of Abu Qatada’s co-defendants during the Jordanian trial, which makes it clear
that ill-treatment is likely to take place. A MoU such as the one between Jordan and
the UK is not a valid safeguard to ensure Abu Qatada will not be tortured. It should not
have been accepted by the Court as enabling his deportation out of security reasons.
All these interventions and arguments to justify refoulement to torture, be it through
promoting the security exception of Suresh or through providing a MoU, can be traced
back to changes in national security policies fueled by the attempts to eradicate
terrorism since the events of 9/11. For example, in a policy proposal that leaked to the
media in 2003, the UK observed that if Article 3 of the ECHR solely applied to acts
taking place inside the territory of a State Party, then the government would only need
to be concerned with the torture and degrading treatment occurring inside the UK. To
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achieve this, it considered convincing the European Court of Human Rights to reverse
its opinion on the absoluteness of Article 3 but admitted that this is very hard to achieve.
As a Plan B, they suggested re-negotiating the ECHR to exclude an extraterritorial
effect or to limit its protection by at least allowing refoulement to face inhuman or
degrading treatment.202 Here, the UK completely ignored the fact that even if they renegotiated the ECHR to not include a non-refoulement provision, they are still bound
by the one in the CAT. It is an example how states look for ways to undermine the
absolute prohibition of torture. In order to pursue their security interests, they are
willing to hand over the responsibility to another state and have it take care of the “dirty
work” like torture to extract information from suspects. This way of thinking is exactly
what led to introducing illegal security measures such as extraordinary rendition and is
furthered through using arguments such as in Suresh. It is the task of international and
domestic courts to curb these attempts by confirming the absoluteness of the
prohibition of torture, the way the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee
against Torture do. But the more often states argue there is a need for security
exceptions to refoulement to torture, the more likely it is that a court may accept it such
as in Suresh, this may cause a snowball effect and lead other jurisdictions accepting it
too.
C. Proliferation of Extraordinary Rendition and Securitization of Migration
In recent years, states interpreted the Refugee Convention very broadly for the sake of
implementing their security strategies. Some of the taken measures are verging on the
illegal but carefully phrased to make sure they still fall within the borders of
international law. For instance, the definition of refugee, the exception clauses to nonrefoulement in Article 33(2), and the exclusion provisions of Article 1F are being
stretched as far as possible in numerous jurisdictions.203 The creation of international
zones in airports, for instance, is aimed at preventing refugees from entering a state’s
territory and applying for asylum, but this would amount to rejection at the frontier and
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constitute a violation of non-refoulement. To avoid this, states do allow asylum seekers
to lodge their applications, however they apply lesser procedural standards for these
cases of only legal and not physical presence. The results are often fast-track or
summary proceedings that put asylum-seekers at a disadvantage in comparison to those
applying regularly.204 Another example is Australia’s Pacific Strategy through which
certain islands are excluded from the Australian migration zone. Instead, asylum
seekers arriving there are referred to status determination centers in Nauru or Manus
Island. Also in this case, Australia took care to phrase its strategy in a way that does
not violate international law (namely by emphasizing that the refugees will receive fair
asylum procedures in these territories).205 In other cases, security measures are not
merely close to bordering on the illegal, but actually cross the line. Examples of this
include the practice of extraordinary rendition.
Rendition traditionally described the process of transferring a person to another state
for criminal prosecution based on a previous extradition agreement between the
concerned states.206 The term extraordinary rendition, on the other hand, has no clear
definition in international law207 but became a commonly used expression in
connection with the ‘War on Terror’. In these cases, suspected terrorists would be
transported to a foreign country to conduct coercive interrogation without being in
reach of the judicial review of domestic courts.208 Typically the interrogation
techniques would constitute ill treatment or even amount to torture, which is exactly
the reason why some states prefer to secretly let other states perform these tasks. This
way they can claim not to have broken international law themselves. However, they
violate the non-refoulement to torture rule, which is part of the prohibition of torture in
the CAT as discussed above. States are bound by it either through being State Party
through the CAT or by the prohibition being a norm of ius cogens, which includes nonrefoulement.
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The first case of extraordinary rendition that reached an international tribunal was
Agiza v. Sweden209 in front of the Committee Against Torture.210 Ahmed Agiza is an
Egyptian citizen who applied for asylum in Sweden in 2000. He claimed that he would
be at risk of torture in Egypt as he had previously been tortured by the security police
when he was suspected of having been involved in the assassination of President Anwar
Sadat. In 1999, a military tribunal sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment with hard
labor without possibility of appeal for allegedly being a member of the Islamic Jihad.211
Sweden denied his application for asylum due to security reasons and ordered his
expulsion to Egypt. To free itself from allegations of refouling Agiza to torture, the
government obtained an assurance from Egypt that he would not be subjected to any
kind of ill-treatment upon return.212
In reality, Agiza faced ill-treatment as soon as his deportation began. The Swedish
police handed him over to US security personnel that had chartered a plane to transport
Agiza and a second asylum seeker suspected of terrorist activities to Cairo. An
Ombudsman of the Swedish parliament later investigated the expulsion of Agiza and
came to the result that the Swedish Security Police lost control over the situation at the
airport, which resulted in the inhumane treatment of the two men in custody. The
American personnel that managed the extradition were wearing masks and conducted
a “security check” on Agiza that included removing his clothes with scissors, searching
his body, binding his hands and feet, pulling a hood over his head and strapping him to
a mattress for the entire flight.213 Upon his return to Egypt, he was held incommunicado
for five weeks and later transferred to Tora prison. During visits by his parents and
Swedish diplomats he reported having been ill-treated and tortured by the Egyptian
security forces.214 In 2005, the Committee Against Torture dealt with the involvement
of Sweden in this case of torture. It came to the conclusion that at the time of Agiza’s
expulsion, the Swedish government should have known that Egypt resorted to
widespread torture in its prisons and the applicant was facing a particularly high risk
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due to being detained for political and security purposes. Obtaining a diplomatic
assurance was not a valid means to protect Agiza from torture. It lacks a mechanism of
enforcement and does not suffice to relieve Sweden from its responsibility. Therefore,
the refoulement of Agiza by Sweden was a violation of the absolute prohibition of
torture of Article 3 CAT.215
Unfortunately, Agiza does not stand alone but is just one in a long list of extraordinary
rendition cases. A striking case was the extraordinary rendition of Maher Arar. Arar is
a Canadian citizen who had left his country of origin Syria at the age of 17. After many
years of living and working in Canada with his wife and two children, he passed
through JFK airport in the US on his way home from a trip to Tunis. There he was
detained for being suspected of having connections to a member of a terrorist
organization. Against his will he was transported to Syria where he was held in an
underground cell for one year and subjected to horrific torture. Despite the fact that the
US had obtained an assurance from Syria beforehand to guarantee Arar’s safety.216 The
Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher
Arar found that there is no evidence that Arar ever committed a criminal offence, nor
that he might be a security threat to Canada. Nevertheless, Canada did not effectively
try to obtain Arar’s release from US/Syrian custody and failed to protect its citizen
from unlawful extraordinary rendition.217
Several European states have been involved in extraordinary rendition by cooperating
with the US Central Intelligence Agency. They either helped by detaining individuals
and handing them over to the CIA for rendition, or by allowing the US to operate in
secret detention centers on their territory. Some examples for these incidents can be
found in the database of the European Court of Human Rights: El-Masri v. The former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Al-Nashiri v. Poland, Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v.
Poland, Nasr and Ghali v. Italy, Al Nashiri v. Romania and Abu Zubaydah v. Lithuania.
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The last two cases are not yet decided, but in all others the Court came to the conclusion
that the states violated Article 3 ECHR and other articles.218
These cases of extraordinary rendition are examples of how measures, taken in the
name of security, can very easily get out of hand. There is no doubt that extraordinary
rendition violates international law, but states continue to defy the prohibition of torture
by conducting it in secret or by claiming that a diplomatic assurance is enough to
whitewash them from any allegations of (indirectly) using torture. The Committee
Against Torture tries to keep governments in check and condemns states’ participation
in refoulement to torture in its decisions. Other institutions follow suit. For example,
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights stated in one of its reports that
practices like extraordinary rendition amount to a violation of the principle of nonrefoulement and are a violation of Article 3 of the CAT and also Article 7 of the
ICCPR.219 Regrettably, the decisions of these treaty and intergovernmental bodies are
not enforceable and depend on States Parties’ willingness to conform to them.
Therefore, it is up to domestic courts or regional courts like the European Court of
Human Rights that render binding judgements to ensure governments and parliaments
will not make executive orders or enact legislation that violate non-refoulement to
torture. In their decisions, they set the boundaries of how far states may go when they
balance security interests against refoulement to torture and confirm that the absolute
prohibition of torture is a red line that may not be overstepped. This is why decisions
like Suresh are so troublesome. By introducing a vaguely formulated exception for
when refoulement to torture is possible, it erodes the absolute prohibition of torture and
leaves a loophole for states to justify increasingly harsh security measures at a time
when such measures are proliferating. To prevent this idea from spreading it is
necessary to bring the problematic aspects of the Suresh exception back to attention
and to ensure that other courts will not use it. Furthermore, it would be important for
the Canadian Supreme Court to overturn the Suresh decision to reestablish consistency
in its case law and with Canada’s international obligations.
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IV. How to Determine Who Constitutes a Security Threat?
The Suresh exception was built on the idea that threat to a state’s security can justify
refoulement to torture. But how can this drastic infringement of human rights be based
on such a vague term? What constitutes a security threat is not easily determinable and
varies from country to country and on the international level. Article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention states, that posing a “danger to the security” of the asylum
granting country, renders the prohibition of refoulement inapplicable to the individual
in question.220 Unfortunately, there is no clear definition in the Convention of which
acts would constitute a danger. The travaux préparatoires indicate that the delegates at
the Conference of Plenipotentiaries had persons in mind who would enter the host state
as refugees and then carry out activities against it on behalf of a foreign power.221 This
idea of security threats to justify refoulement has been adopted into domestic
legislations, as for example through the security certificate mechanism in Canada. In
Suresh, the court determined that Suresh’s fundraising activity for the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka constitutes a danger to the security of Canada and thus it is possible to deport
him.222
With regards to these findings several problematic issues arise. Firstly, there is no clear
definition of the term “danger to national security”. Most states use it synonymous
with the involvement in terrorism but this does not help to clarify the situation at all as
there is no agreement concerning the definition of terrorism. Secondly, the Canadian
Supreme Court might have gone too far in declaring Suresh a threat to Canadian
security if the Tamil Tigers only operate in Sri Lanka. This leads to the discussion
whether there has to be a direct threat to a state’s security or whether an indirect threat
suffices. And thirdly, there is the question to what degree an individual has to be
associated with a terrorist organization, without being actively involved in any terrorist
acts, to be labelled a terrorist.
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A. The Unclear Definition of Terrorism
A common problem with security issues is the lack of a clear, commonly accepted,
definition of what exactly constitutes a threat to national security, as well as of the term
terrorism. Nevertheless, most states frequently use these expressions in their laws and
judgements, especially in the legislation enacted after 9/11.223 In Suresh, the Supreme
Court analyzed whether “terrorism” and “danger to the security of Canada” are
unconstitutionally imprecise terms.224 It came to the conclusion that they are not too
vague as it is possible to interpret these phrases by looking at norms of international
law.225 But in fact, international law does not provide us with a precise answer either.
The first attempts to codify the crime of terrorism took place in 1937. Under the League
of Nations states met to discuss a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism. Here they defined terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and
intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a
group of persons, or the general public.” This attempt for creating a convention was
stopped short by the outbreak of the Second World War which led to the dissolving of
the League of Nations. After the war, between 1968 and 1972, incidents like the attack
and hostage taking during the Munich Olympics and a series of aircraft hijackings
brought states together again to discuss an international approach against terrorism.226
The US introduced the draft Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism to the United
Nations in 1972 but it was ultimately rejected, as states failed to come to an agreement
on the exact definition of terrorism. Instead, they have issued several resolutions
condemning all acts of terrorism and resorted to concluding agreements outlawing
specific acts related to terrorism without including an all-encompassing definition.227
As of today, the international community has agreed upon nineteen international legal
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instruments to combat certain terrorist acts.228 This way it was possible to avoid the
disputed issues and guarantee a widespread support of these treaties.229
In order to have a general definition of terrorism, there would need to be a clear
agreement on several elements: the perpetrators, the victim, the type of act qualifying
as terrorism, the motive behind it and the place and time it occurs.230 Some of these
elements, however, have been cause for disagreement between states, which is the
reason why no universal definition of terrorism has been adopted in an international
treaty yet. The most contentious issue is who can be the perpetrator of a terrorist act.
Originally, terrorism referred to acts of terror committed by states against their citizens
as a form of state control, for example during the Jacobins’ “Reign of Terror” after the
French Revolution.231 Over time the focus shifted and also non-state actors were
identified as committing terrorist acts. For example, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia
was viewed as being run by terrorists. Also, the assassination of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in 1914 by ethnic separatists, which started the First World War, was
considered terrorism. In the 1940s, Jewish extremists aiming at Israel’s independence
as a Jewish state assassinated the British politician Lord Moynes, the UN mediator
Count Bernadotte, and executed a bombing attack on the King David Hotel in
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Jerusalem. All these incidents were carried out by non-state actors, which showed that
terrorism was not limited to being exercised by states.232
During the Cold War, the international community was split into two factions on this
issue. The US and the USSR both secretly supported revolutionary movements aimed
at overthrowing their respective opponent. 233 They feared that this meddling in the
internal affairs of other states would be labelled as terrorism if the definition was to
include acts by states. Therefore, they opposed the inclusion of states as possible
perpetrators, while those countries at the receiving end of this interference were in favor
of qualifying these acts as terrorism. At the same time, the Third World was struggling
to free itself from colonial rule and to fight for every nation’s right to selfdetermination. This right was successfully included in Article 1 of the ICCPR in 1966
and in the Declaration of Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations
in 1970234. When it came to the question of including the conduct of non-state actors
in the definition of terrorism, the states that had been affected by colonial rule were
worried that the fight for national liberation could be qualified as terrorism.235 Thus,
they wished for a clear exclusion of acts related to the right to self-determination, while
the colonial states had an interest in refusing this distinction in order to label any
rebellious attacks against their rule as terrorism.
Other elements of the definition of terrorism were also subject of discussion. For
example, it needs to be determined whether there are any limitations on the targets of
terrorist attacks. Who is the enemy of terrorism? Does it refer to attacks against state
institutions and its personnel, or does it target society and refers to violence against
civilians?236 Do only acts which cause serious bodily harm to a large group of civilians
count as terrorism, or is damage to property sufficient to qualify a crime as terrorism?
There are no straightforward answers to these questions and the Conventions on
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terrorist related acts differ on these points.237 Apart from these objective elements of
the crime of terrorism, states also have to agree on the subjective aspects of it. Terrorist
attacks differ from ordinary crimes because there is a certain motivation behind it.
Sometimes the attackers try to coerce the leaders of a state into acting a specific way.238
In other occasions the aim is to take revenge for certain political acts by the states or to
spread fear among the population. It lies upon the international community to decide
in how far a certain motivation is required to fulfill the elements of the crime of
terrorism.
Theoretically, it should be possible to find an agreement on all these elements in order
to create a general definition of terrorism. However, the problem in this context are the
political interests of the states involved that influence their decision making. Every
state prefers to shape the definition of terrorism in a way that ensures its own conduct
will not fall under the definition but the acts of the groups or states they consider their
opponents will.239 The danger with such a highly political concept like terrorism is that
it can easily be abused to delegitimize the political opponents of a state and that it can
be used to stigmatize and morally judge certain groups.240 Therefore, the stakes are
high with regards to finding a general definition. There must not be any artificial
distinctions between certain perpetrators in order to avoid creating double standards.
But at the same time, it needs to consider certain struggles that should not fall under
the definition of terrorism as they are a form of legitimate violence, such as the right to
self-determination or the right to self-defense. A rebellion against a cruel dictator, for
instance, can be seen as a struggle for freedom or as a terrorist attack against a rightful
government. The international law scholar Ben Saul described the essence of the
problem: “There are no clean lines between terrorism and other forms of political
violence, and the debate about defining terrorism is also a debate about the
classification of political violence in all its myriad forms: riot, revolt, rebellion, war,
conflict, uprising, revolution, subversion, intervention, guerilla warfare, and so on.”241
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These underlying political motives, which states bring to the bargaining table, stand in
the way of finding a definition of terrorism that fulfills the requirement of the legal
discourse of being precise, objective and certain enough.242
The non-existence of a universal definition of terrorism leaves states plenty of room to
determine for themselves what they consider a terrorist act. As a consequence, no two
anti-terrorism law look exactly the same as states opt to use the term terrorism in
different ways.243 The UK, for instance, opted for a very broad domestic definition and
considers every individual to be a terrorist who has links to a terrorist group through
supporting or assisting it.244 In the US, supporting somebody who plans to commit a
terrorist act through material support or funding, counts as personally engaging in
terrorist activity.245 Often states even use varying definitions in different legal fields
within their domestic law.246 This increases the fragmentation of the terrorism
definition and shows how far we are from developing a global consensus if there is not
even a uniform definition of the term on a national level. For example, in Canada
Section 19 of the Immigration Act refers to the term terrorism as one of the reasons a
person would be inadmissible in Canada and refugee status would be denied.247
However, the Immigration Act does not include a definition of what acts exactly would
fall under the expression “engage in terrorism”. 248
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Canadian Supreme Court had to deal
with this problem in Suresh as the security certificate for Suresh’s deportation was
based on precisely the accusation of Suresh engaging in terrorism. The Court did not
attempt to provide a general definition of terrorism and instead referred to General
Assembly Resolution 54/109 from 1999 which adopted the International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. It defined terrorism as a crime
falling in the scope of one of nine treaties annexed to the resolution that dealt with the
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illegality of specific terrorist acts.249 From this the Court deducted that terrorism in the
Immigration Act shall mean any “act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
to a civilian […] when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate
a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act”.250 According to the Court, this would provide enough
information on how to adjudicate cases of terrorism. Therefore, it declared the term
terrorism precise enough to be constitutional.251
It is peculiar that in this context the Court relied on international law, more specifically
the above mentioned General Assembly Resolution, to determine that the term
terrorism is not too vague. As I have illustrated in this chapter, the term terrorism is
inherently vague and lacks a clear definition in international law. It is susceptible to
being manipulated for political reasons, a fact that the Court acknowledged in in
Suresh.252 Furthermore, when it came to the absolute prohibition of torture, the same
Court refused to resort to international law in its judgement. It ignored the fact that
Canada is bound to the CAT as it ratified the Convention. Instead, it only accepted
domestic law as basis to examine the legality of refoulement to torture. Following this
logic, the Court should have had only considered the Immigration Act in its
interpretation, which does not provide a definition of terrorism that would make it
possible to clearly qualify Suresh’s behavior as engaging in such acts. A strong and
well-established provision of ius cogens character like the absolute prohibition of
torture was not enough for the Court to declare the illegality of refouling somebody to
torture. But at the same time the vague and unclear definition of terrorism in
international law was sufficient to trigger the refoulement of Suresh.
As long as there is no clear definition of terrorism and exact guidelines how to qualify
someone’s behavior as falling under it, any law dependent on it is prone to
manipulation and to be used for disposing of political opponents. Measures that
infringe essential human rights, like refoulement to torture, must not be based on such
an imprecise term. Due to its vagueness, it is not clear how far governments and courts
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may go in interpreting it. This can become problematic in the application of the law, as
has been shown in Suresh with regards to two issues: Can a threat against another
country indirectly constitute a threat to Canada’s security and thus qualify as an act of
terrorism? And what degree of association to a terrorist organization is required to label
Suresh as a terrorist and justify his refoulement?
B. Direct or Indirect Threats
The security certificate against Suresh regarded him as a danger to national security for
being a fundraiser for the World Tamil Movement, which is associated with the
LTTE.253 It was based on the opinion of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service that
the LTTE was a terrorist organization, although it operates only in Sri Lanka and its
purpose is to support the Tamils in the ongoing civil war.254 How can the LTTE be a
threat to Canada’s security if its operations are limited to the domestic armed conflict
in Sri Lanka?
The Canadian Supreme Court accepted that the most qualified refugee scholars are of
the opinion that there needs to be a direct connection between the terrorist act and the
security of the host country. Also, the travaux préparatoires of the Refugee Convention
suggest that threats to the security of another state are not sufficient to trigger
refoulement.255 However, the Court claimed that after the events of 2001 this is no
longer accurate and indicated that an indirect threat is already enough to endanger
Canada’s security, as terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon.256 It concluded that there
“must be a real and serious possibility of adverse effect to Canada. But the threat need
not be direct; rather it may be grounded in distant events that indirectly have a real
possibility of harming Canadian security.”257
Several issues arise from this statement. As Lauterpacht and Bethlehem already
established, interpreting the Refugee Convention’s exception to non-refoulement so
generously that possible threats to other countries or the international community
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would suffice, is inconsistent with the purpose of this exception.258 Provisions like
Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention were introduced to allow countries of refuge
to return refugees that directly threaten states’ security and population. There is
consensus between the refugee law scholars Bruin, Wouters, Hathaway, and Harvey,
that it was not right for the Court to simply assume that there might be “adverse
repercussions” for Canada through the individual’s behavior to support a terrorist group
abroad, but instead Article 33(2) would require a clear proof of a negative impact on
Canada’s international relations or welfare.259 Secondly, threats to other states can be
dealt with through other means, less extreme than refoulement to torture. Suspects can
be detained and prosecuted in front of domestic courts to establish their involvement
in terrorist acts. Deporting a refugee such as Suresh would actually increase the danger
to Canada. The conflict he is allegedly involved in so far only takes place in Sri Lanka
between the government and the Tamil minority. If Canada interferes by refouling a
refugee to torture, it is taking a side in this conflict. Returning rebel fighters to Sri
Lanka, where they had been persecuted and tortured, is equal to officially opposing the
LTTE, which as a consequence might choose Canada as a target of its operations to
take revenge. In this sense, the state’s security would be better protected through
keeping Suresh in Canadian control and prosecuting him than by resorting to
refoulement.260 Thirdly, the Court failed to mention how exactly Suresh poses an
indirect threat to Canada. There were no explanations in the judgement on how the
situation in Sri Lanka, and Suresh’s involvement in it, will cause serious harm to his
country of refuge. It is not very likely that any armed attacks will be carried out against
the Canadian population or its democratic institutions. Therefore, the fundraising
activities of Suresh are far from constituting a “real and serious possibility of adverse
effect to Canada”,261 which the Court had asked for.
All these considerations do not only apply to Suresh in specific, but are relevant for all
cases of refoulement based on security reasons. The Canadian Supreme Court raised a
valid point in claiming that the security interdependence of states can cause events in

258

Lauterpacht & Bethlehem, supra note 7, at para. 165. Also Goodwin-Gill agrees with this view in
GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAMS, supra note 17, at 236.
259
Bruin & Wouters, supra note 131, at 18. Hathaway & Harvey, supra note 18, at 290.
260
Okafor & Okoronkwo, supra note 94, at 39.
261
Suresh, supra note 1, at para. 88.

49

one country to have negative effects on another country.262 When assessing the threat
emanating from an asylum seeker or refugee, courts will inevitably face the question
of how direct the danger to the country of refuge needs to be in order to justify a
deportation. Even though governments might show a tendency to interpret the concept
of threat widely to include indirect threats, the above described counter-arguments still
apply. Classifying a threat against another country as sufficient to justify refoulement,
is against the purpose of Article 33(2) of the Refugee Convention. It is necessary to
provide adequate evidence that an individual’s behavior has a direct negative impact
on the security of the country of refuge, only then the exception to non-refoulement
may apply (if no other issues, such as a risk of torture upon return, stand in the way).263
The Canadian Supreme Court’s attempt to broaden the application of Article 33(2) of
the Refugee Convention to include indirect threats to a state, mirrors the general trend
of expanding the exclusion clauses in order to exclude terrorists from refugee
protection.264 Article 1F of the Refugee Convention originally does not include the term
terrorism.265 However, already in 1997 the General Assembly passed a resolution that
created a link between refugees and the fight against terrorism. It asked states to “take
appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and
international law […] before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that
the asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts.”266 Also it confirmed that acts
of terrorism are “contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”267
The exclusion grounds in Article 1F are an exhaustive enumeration and no further
reasons can be added.268 Thus, states try to fit terrorist acts under the existing
categories. A terrorist can be excluded under Article 1F(a) if his acts amount to a crime
against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in international
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instruments such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.269 Subsection (b) excludes individuals who have committed a serious non-political crime
outside the country of refuge prior to admission. This ground has been cause for debate
in the international community. It has been argued that a terrorist might be able to
escape this exclusion clause by claiming s/he had political motives for their crime.270
However, there are some additional requirements to be fulfilled to benefit from this
excuse. The crime has to be committed out of political motives, aimed at changing the
political situation in a state, and has to be proportionate. The last requirement is where
acts of terrorism would fail the test. Acts of atrocious nature or highly disproportionate
crimes do not qualify as political crimes.271 Therefore, acts of terrorism might fall under
this exclusion ground if the crime is serious enough. The last category, 1F(c), leaves
the most room for interpretation. It excludes individuals who have been guilty of acts
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. There are countless acts
which could be contrary to the purposes of the United Nations, for example violations
of human rights by policy makers or individuals who participated in persecution. Also,
the UN made it its goal to fight against drug trafficking, to promote democracy, and to
oppose colonialism, to only name a few. Any person acting against these purposes
could fall under this exclusion clause.272 The aforementioned General Assembly
Resolution opened the door for states to use 1F(c) to exclude anyone suspected of
terrorism. Indeed, there is a clear trend towards frequently referring to this article with
regards to anti-terrorism measures,273 which now also makes the exclusion clauses
more susceptible to abuse by governments to target opposition groups.274
There are three points of critique against such developments. Firstly, it created the
impression that refugee law and terrorism are inevitably connected, whereas entering a
state illegally or on a student or work visa is much easier for a potential terrorist than
going through the refugee status determination process.275 Also, it is equally possible
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that a terror attack is committed by a citizen of the state at risk, not by a migrant.
Secondly, it increased the risk that somebody suspected of engaging in terrorism will
be automatically excluded merely based on the UN Resolutions without an exact
application of the exclusion clauses’ wording.276 And thirdly, there is again the
possibility of politics influencing what are supposed to be legal and objective decisions.
This is due to the political implications with regards to defining terrorism, as described
above under chapter IV.B. and the problematic aspects of determining the necessary
degree of association to a terrorist organization which will be discussed in the following
section.
C. Guilt by Association?
The Security Certificate which had been issued against Suresh stated that, according to
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the LTTE is engaged in terrorist activity in
Sri Lanka and operates in Canada under the cloak of the World Tamil Movement
(WTM). Suresh is a member of these organizations and thus a threat to national
security.277 In his defense, Suresh argued that he has only been engaged in fundraising
activities and not involved in any actual terrorist acts.278 The questions arising from
this are the following: Is Suresh’s mere membership sufficient to link him to the
terrorist activities carried out by the LTTE and to identify him as a danger to Canada?
And what degree of association to a terrorist organization is necessary to make an
individual responsible for the terrorist acts of the group?
When states opt for a too broad definition of who counts as engaging in terrorism, they
might include individuals whose conduct is not even remotely dangerous or significant
enough to justify being labelled a security threat. Hathaway gives striking examples
that show the extreme level such an approach can reach. For example, the US Supreme
Court stated that teaching the Kurdistan Workers’ Party how to submit a petition with
the UN already counts as illegal support to a terroristic group. Citing Fullerton,279 he
remarks that in line with this argument, even lending a bicycle to Nelson Mandela
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would had been qualified as material support to a terror organization at the time the
African National Congress was forbidden under the apartheid regime.280 Merely this
loose association to organizations which are forbidden by their respective states, is
considered sufficient proof for engaging in terrorism. This contradicts the principle that
every refugee should receive an individual assessment concerning his/her refugee
status or the denial of it, not an assessment based on acts committed by others. To avoid
any arbitrary conduct in the refoulement process, it would had been necessary to
evaluate Suresh’s individual behavior to see if he had intent to further the LTTE’s
terrorist activities. However, regardless of how an evaluation of Suresh would end,
whether he knowingly supported terrorist acts or not, the issue at hand is much bigger
than Suresh.
It is a general trend that states are widening the net for who qualifies as a terrorist. An
example for this is the law on Providing Material Support to Terrorists in Title 18 of
the US Code on Crimes and Criminal Procedure,281 that has been subject to significant
changes over the past years. When it was first enacted in 1994, it outlawed the support
of terrorists through directly providing them with weapons or money. However, it also
included two exception: humanitarian assistance and support for the “nonviolent
political, religious, philosophical, or ideological goals or beliefs of any person or
group” were not forbidden under this law.282 If the supported organization engaged in
terrorist and non-terrorist activities, then the prosecution had to prove that the
defendant had the intent to support terrorism. This additional requirement and the
exception for nonviolent activities were removed in an amendment in 1996. In 2001,
the Patriot Act expanded the dragnet and added “expert advice or assistance” to the
outlawed ways of supporting a terrorist group. It was unclear what conduct would
exactly fall under this description. The case of Sami Omar Al-Hussayen’s was the first
to be based on this provision and it shows how these types of laws further the risk of
suspecting innocents of having ties to terror organizations.283
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Al-Hussayen was a PhD student with Saudi Arabian citizenship who had been living
in Idaho in the US for five years with his wife and three sons while completing his
degree in computer studies.284 In 2004, he was accused of providing material support
and resources to persons engaged in acts of terrorism and terrorist organizations and
put to trial.285 Al-Hussayen had been volunteering as webmaster for the Islamic
Assembly of North America which runs a website to aimed at spreading knowledge of
Islam. As part of his work he set up links to different sources on Islam and
contemporary political issues in connection to it.286 In the FBI’s theory, Al-Hussayen’s
PhD studies were only a cover for his mission to raise money for terrorist
organizations.287 In February 2003, hundreds of state officials stormed the campus at
4am, arrested Al-Hussayen and questioned all other Arab students threatening them
with withdrawal of their student visa if they did not cooperate.288 For seventeen months
the defendant was locked up in a cell in solitary confinement while the FBI gathered
further evidence to open a trial on terrorism-related charges, claiming that the website
he had worked on encouraged financial contributions to terror organizations such as
Hamas and Al Qaeda.289 The prosecution argued that the website in question had
previously provided links to other websites asking for donations to organizations like
Hamas and insisted that it was irrelevant whether the defendant intended to support
terrorism or not. According to the amended material support law, this was a correct
view. However, the jury decided that the prosecution provided no evidence to
sufficiently substantiate the charges of material support.290
In connection with the allegations against Al-Hussayen, the FBI arrested another
suspect based on farfetched accusations: Abdullah Al-Kidd. Al-Kidd was born under
the name Lavoni T. Kidd in Kansas as a US citizen (both his parents were US citizens
too), attended the university of Idaho at the same time as Al-Hussayen and was a
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successful football player for the university team. During his college time, he converted
to Islam and changed his first name to fit his new religion. In 2003 he was granted a
scholarship at a Saudi Arabian university to study Arabic and Islamic law but shortly
before his departure he was arrested at the airport.291 The allegations against him were
that he had met with other Arab students at the university who also knew Al-Hussayen,
that he was involved in one financial transaction with Al-Hussayen and had been in
touch with the Islamic charity for which Al-Hussayen had worked as a webmaster. As
a matter of fact, Al-Kidd was never charged with any specific crime.292 Despite this,
he was detained in a high-security prison for sixteen days where he was subjected to
harsh treatment. “He was strip searched […] denied showers, denied visits by his
family, and barely able to sleep under the bright lights that shone twenty-four hours a
day.”293 The FBI justified his arrest by claiming the prosecution had planned to call
him as a witness in the Al-Hussayen case but Al-Kidd was about to leave the country.
What the agent missed to mention was that Al-Kidd had a wife and children in the US
that he would have had returned to after his studies, he had never been informed that
his journey to Saudi Arabia might cause any problems, and as he had cooperated with
the FBI previously he would had been willing to stay in the US and voluntarily appear
as a witness.294 It is more likely that Al-Kidd had been detained this way due to his
suspected association with a terrorist organization merely based on his acquaintance
with Al-Hussayen.
From the point of view of the state, such a broad provision like the current form of the
Material Support Law295 might be a desirable tool. Between 2001 and 2006 the material
support charge was frequently used, and was the top charge in 162 federal prosecution
cases.296 Not having to clearly prove an intent to support terrorism and being able to
base charges on such a loose connection to terrorist activities, as seen in Al-Hussayen’s
webmaster task, might help the prosecution to catch terrorists who could not be indicted
otherwise. But at the same time, there is a high risk of innocent individuals being caught
up in the net of being associated with terrorist organization. In the case of Al-Hussayen
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he was lucky to have been acquitted by the jury. Nevertheless, he had been wrongly
imprisoned for more than a year, his wife had to leave the US with the three children
and return to Saudi Arabia due to immigration law issues based on the allegations
against her husband, and ultimately Al-Hussayen also left the US without completing
his PhD.297 Al-Kidd never got a trial to clear his name from the mark the arrest left on
him. It was difficult to find a job due to being considered a criminal, he lost his
university scholarship and suffered from medical problems as a result of these
events.298 This is a high price these two men had to pay and shows how problematic a
too broadly phrased law can be. It brings with it the risk of criminalizing individuals
who are not associated with a terrorist organization.
In Canada, the Anti-Terrorism Act, which was introduced shortly after the events of
9/11, provided a tautological definition for a terrorist group and described it as an
“entity that has as one of its purposes or activities facilitating or carrying out any
terrorist activity.”299 Such a group does not even have to have committed a terrorist act
by itself, being associated with an entity that has or will engage in terrorism is enough
to be indictable. This extends criminal liability beyond personal conduct and
knowledge and makes it possible to be guilty of terrorist charges for mere
association.300 This brings with it the same difficulties and risks I have just described
with regards to the US legislation on association with terrorist organizations. For
practical purposes the Canadian government maintains a list of terrorist entities. The
Federal Cabinet decides on which organization to include on the list whenever there
are “reasonable grounds to believe that a) the entity has knowingly carried out,
attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated terrorist activity; or b) the entity is
knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with an entity
referred to in paragraph (a)”.301 Also in this context there is a risk of errors when a
group is mistakenly put on the list. This can have severe consequences for the entity as
it will be labelled as a terrorist organization and people will keep their distance from it
out of fear of being associated with terrorism. There are not many safeguards in place
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to prevent this from happening. The Cabinet decides on new entries to the list without
any judicial supervision, and afterwards there are only limited grounds for a review in
front of the Federal Court. A judge will decide based on the information which is
available to him/her whether the adding an entity to the list is justified. It is problematic
that the government does not have to disclose all the information it used for its
determination.302 A number of organizations, among them charity or labor
organizations for instance, have expressed their concern about ending up on the list
undeservedly. Then they would have to invest a lot of money and time to fight in front
of a court to be taken off again, after being publicly stigmatized as a terrorist entity.303
Currently there are 53 organizations listed as terrorist groups with the earliest entries
from the year 2002.304 It is interesting to note for the case of Suresh, that the LTTE was
added to the list only in April 2006, four years after the Supreme Court decision. The
World Tamil Movement was identified by the Federal Cabinet as a front organization
of the LTTE, as raising funds on its behalf and as resorting to measures of intimidation
and extortion to collect these funds. However, it was added to the list even later then
the LTTE, namely in June 2008.305 This means that at the time Suresh was decided, in
January 2002, the Anti-Terrorism Act was already in place but the LTTE and the WTM
were far from being listed as one of the terrorist entities. It remains unclear why so
many years passed after the Supreme Court, and the lower instances and immigration
officials before it, declared those two organizations to be terrorist organizations. Maybe
the evidence the Canadian Security Intelligence Service had against the WTM was not
as strong as originally assumed. This weakens the argument that Suresh is a terrorist
merely through to his membership to these groups. Especially as during the
proceedings concerning the security certificate the immigration officer acknowledged
that Suresh personally had not committed any violent acts in Canada or Sri Lanka.306
When there is such a discrepancy, that an individual is a member of a terrorist
organization or at least associated to it, but never engaged in any terrorist acts
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him/herself, it raises the question whether mere membership or affiliation to a certain
group is enough to presume that s/he poses a risk.307 We have seen in the cases of AlKidd and Al-Hussayen that only relying on the association to a group, without
considering the individual behavior, can be cause for wrongly stigmatizing somebody
as terrorist. In order to take the different nuances of degree of association into account,
it can be helpful to differentiate between three types of organizations: Firstly, the
“typical” terrorist organization which has as its sole purpose to commit terrorist acts.
Secondly, ancillary organizations, that act in association with the previous category of
organizations and indirectly assist in terrorist acts. And thirdly, so-called dual purpose
organizations which
in addition to illegal activities also follow legitimate purposes.308 When somebody is
a member of the first group, which without a doubt commits terrorist acts to achieve its
goals, then it is clear that the individual is engaging in terrorism, regardless of whether
s/he is actively involved in the act or just passively supporting it through the
membership.309 With the other two categories things are more complex. It is possible
that these groups have sub-division that follow civil purposes and are not engaged in
any terrorist activities. If for example a teacher decides to work for a school run by a
charity organization associated with a terrorist entity, or if a dual-purpose group has a
sub-division running hospitals and a doctor decides to work there as a volunteer to help
the poor, then these people cannot automatically be regarded as terrorists. To avoid any
mistakes from happening, mere association should not suffice as proof but additional
evidence concerning the individual behavior and intent and knowledge of the suspect
should be required to determine whether s/he is engaging in terrorist activities.
The above examples made clear why states should avoid legislation which makes it
possible to accuse almost anyone of having ties to terrorist association. Using laws
which disregard the different degrees of association to an organization, but
automatically declare somebody guilty by association, are prone to lead to
misjudgments. They lead to situations where a simple act like buying something at a
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charity bazaar to support a suppressed minority in a certain country could suddenly
qualify as terrorism, if the organization behind the bazaar has ties to a group using
violence in that struggle abroad. This causes a very high level of legal uncertainty and
makes it impossible for citizens to foresee which acts could possibly bring them in
connection with terrorism. Introducing more detailed guidelines on how to evaluate
different degrees of association and to require thorough evidence on the individual’s
role with regards to the terrorist entity or his/her intent, can help to avoid wrong
accusations. In addition, it will not only protect innocents but with the additional
evidence requirements it will also be possible to clearly identify those who are really
involved in terrorist attacks. Therefore, creating laws which are less broad and do not
rely on vague terms, does not stand in the way of combatting security threats but
actually improves the safety of a state’s citizens.
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V. Alternative Ways of Protecting Security Interests
As seen in the previous chapters, some states consider refoulement the ideal way of
dealing with a security threat. They focus only on Article 33(2) of the Refugee
Convention and their corresponding domestic legislation to justify this measure even
in cases where refugees would be refouled to a risk of torture. However, Article 5 of
the Refugee Convention states that “nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to
impair any rights and benefits granted by a Contracting State to refugees apart from
this Convention.” This confirms that states have to consider their obligations under
international human rights treaties when dealing with this issue. For example, Article
3 of the CAT, Article 3 of the ECHR, or Article 7 of the ICCPR all clearly forbid states
to refoule somebody to a risk of torture.310 I argued in chapter three that all states are
bound by the absolute prohibition of torture and the principle of non-refoulement to
torture due to it being a norm of ius cogens. Therefore, refouling any person to torture
in order to protect national security interests is not a legal option to address security
threats, even if there is no alternative available to address the security issue.
However, when a refugee is suspected of being a security threat, there is an alternative
to refoulement to torture: domestic prosecution. For example, the fundraising activities
of Suresh could have fallen under the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism,311 which under its Article 4 obliges States Parties to create
corresponding criminal offences under its domestic law.312 Canada is a State Party to
this Convention and could have prosecuted Suresh under the corresponding domestic
provision in its criminal law. If found guilty, he would had received a prison sentence
and would no longer be a threat to national security. This way the state protects its
security interests without violating its human rights obligations. Even though the Court
in Suresh regarded refoulement to torture as the right solution to ensure that Canada
does not become a safe haven for terrorists, this does not automatically mean that it is
the only option to protect the state.313 When it comes to nationals being suspected of
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terrorist acts, a domestic trial and imprisonment are considered sufficient to neutralize
the threat they are posing. In these cases, the defendant will receive an appropriate
sentence according to national criminal law, depending on the seriousness of the crime
and this is accepted as protecting a country’s population from any security threats. Why
should this not apply to refugees too?
States will argue that it is possible to differentiate between residents of a state based on
their nationality, especially with regards to expulsion. States have the right to decide
freely over who they grant entry into their territory as part of their sovereignty, thus
they can deport aliens in accordance with their national laws.314 Citizens, on the other
hand, benefit from their right not to be expelled from their country of nationality, even
if they committed a crime. Therefore, domestic prosecution is the only possible option
to combat terrorist threats emanating from nationals.315 This distinction between
citizens and non-citizens is in accordance with international law. For example, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
forbids all types of racial discrimination “based on race, colour, descent, or national or
ethnic origin”.316 However, Article 1(2) clearly states that the Convention does not
apply to distinctions made between citizens and non-citizens.317 Also, Article 13 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights318 allows for the expulsion of
aliens lawfully in the country out of reasons of national security. Therefore, it is legal
for states to deport foreigners to their country of origin if they have committed a crime
or are considered to be inadmissible for other reasons. However, in cases of
refoulement to torture the situation is different. Those refugees lost the protection of
their country of origin and will not receive a fair trial for their crimes there, instead
they face the risk of torture. In this context, the absolute prohibition of torture restricts
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a state’s right to deport a non-citizen as it is a non-derogable norm. The only way to
contain the security threat without violating this ius cogens provision is to try the
suspect domestically.
There are several arguments in favor of opting for domestic prosecution. Firstly, opting
for the domestic prosecution of a refugee suspected of terrorism does not cause any
disadvantage or additional risk to the state but helps to contain a possible threat. Okafor
and Okoronkwo illustrate accurately how arbitrary the differentiation based on
citizenship is. Let us assume that a Sri Lankan married couple comes to Canada to
study for a few years. During their stay, a son is born who receives Canadian
citizenship. Shortly afterwards they return to live in Sri Lanka and have a daughter.
Many years later the family returns to Canada as refugees but the two grown up children
had engaged in activities with the LTTE and are therefore regarded as a security threat
to Canada. The Suresh exception allows for the daughter to be refouled even if she
faces torture upon return. Her brother will under all circumstances remain in Canada
even if he would pose a much higher risk to the state than her.319 This formalist way of
differentiating between them based on citizenship not on the seriousness of risk does
not contribute to protecting Canada’s security.
Secondly, we could draw an analogy from the principle of aut dedere aut judicare,
which states that when extradition (or in this case, refoulement) is not an option, then
domestic prosecution is the right path to follow. The expression aut dedere aut judicare
was coined by the famous international law scholar Hugo Grotius, though he used a
slightly different phrasing.320 Dedere refers to the practice of surrendering or
extraditing an individual, while judicare is the stem form of the word adjudicate which
in this context means to prosecute. This principle is commonly used and incorporated
in over 70 international criminal law conventions.321 It is aimed at “securing
international cooperation in the suppression of certain kinds of criminal conduct.322 It
obliges states to either extradite an offender if asked for this, or in case they refuse to
319
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do so, to prosecute him/her in front of the competent court.323 There is disagreement
over to what extent this rule has become customary international law, and whether it
includes only the most heinous crimes such as crimes against humanity or genocide, or
applies to all international offenses.324 It is unnecessary for the purpose of my thesis to
elaborate on this debate. All the treaties concerning the suppression of terrorism include
a provision resembling the following: “The State Party in the territory of which the
alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to
submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.”325 This
clearly refers to the principle of aut dedere aut judicare.
The reason behind this principle of either extradite or prosecute, is the common interest
states have to suppress all forms of crime. One could also describe it as a moral and
social order that all states want to achieve, and in order to do so they follow this
principle.326 Usually aut dedere aut judicare is applied when a state refuses to extradite
an individual to ensure the person will not go unpunished. In the incidents of
refoulement to torture, on the other hand, it is a slightly different situation. The state
actually wants to deport a refugee and intends to leave it to the state of origin how to
deal with the alleged terrorist. However, this is forbidden under international law due
to the absolute prohibition of torture. Aut dedere aut judicare shows us two possible
ways of how to deal with a suspected terrorist. When leaving the prosecution to another
state is not an option, then the state needs to domestically prosecute the individual. This
way a potential criminal does not go unpunished and the security threat will be
neutralized.
Thirdly, domestic prosecution is at the moment the only possibility to ensure the
suspected terrorist will not go unpunished while still ensuring his/her human rights will
not be infringed. It would be desirable to prosecute terrorists on an international level
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under one uniform criminal law to ensure they will receive the same fair treatment
during the trial regardless of where in the world they were detained. Due to the crossborder character of terrorism, some authors suggest to expand the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court to include acts of terrorism,327 or even propose the
establishment of an International Court for the Prosecution of Global Terrorists.328
These are laudable propositions but unlikely to be realized due to the lack of consensus
within the international community on a definition of terrorism. As there is no
international court which could undertake the prosecution, it has to be done on a
domestic level. Refouling the refugee to the country of origin is not an option because
it would mean a violation of the absolute prohibition of torture, therefore it is left to the
country of refuge to deal with the threat.
Once the state has opted for conducting a domestic trial, the court examines the
evidence brought against the suspected terrorist and decides whether he is guilty of any
crime or not. In case of a conviction s/he will receive the same sentence as a citizen
depending on the severity of the crime. It is very important that during this process
states abide by the requirements of due process even for non-nationals. Unfortunately,
this does not always happen. For example, after the attacks of 9/11, the US applied
much lesser standards on trials of aliens. Those foreigners accused of terrorist crimes
would be tried in front of military tribunals or simply interrogated, detained and
deported under immigration law.329 The general public in many states often accepts or
at least does not question when aliens do not get the same rights as nationals and
considers treating them differently legitimate for security purposes. For instance, Dick
Cheney, former Vice-President of the United States, stated that aliens threatening to
kill innocent Americans “don’t deserve the same guarantees and safeguards that would
be used for an American citizen”.330 This is incorrect from a legal point of view. For
the most part, human rights apply to citizens and non-citizens equally. Constitutions
often reserve certain rights only to nationals, but these usually concern the political
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participation such as the right to vote or to run for an office. All other rights apply to
citizens and non-citizens alike. For example, as stated in chapter III.A.1, the Canadian
Charter applies to everyone, nationals and foreigners, to the same extent.331 Also the
US constitution grants most of its rights regardless of nationality. In the context of
domestic prosecution of terrorists, it is important that, for instance, “the right to a public
trial, a trial by jury, the assistance of a lawyer, and the right to confront adverse
witnesses” apply to refugees.332 Unfortunately, these rights are not always complied
with.
When it comes to alleged terrorists, the United States and other countries tend to resort
to harsh measures which constitute human rights violations. Extraordinary rendition
became a popular practice after the attacks of 9/11, as well as the indeterminate
detainment of suspects in camps like Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib.333 The list of
human rights violations taking place in these camps is long. During the interrogation
of the detainees, illegal methods were used, such as waterboarding and other abusive
and degrading treatment.334 The US claimed that these acts were justified until the socalled ‘War on Terror’ ended.335 To combat security threats, it violated fundamental
human rights. Most worrying of all, many individuals were found innocent in the end.
They were wrongly detained for several years based on incorrect evidence,336 raising
speculation about how many other cases of miscarriage of justice may have gone
undetected. It is essential that domestic prosecution of refugees involved in terrorist
activities observes international human rights law and abides by the requirements of
due process. Otherwise, it ceases to be a legitimate alternative to refoulement to torture.
When conducted with due process, domestic prosecution is the best solution to avert
security threats.
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VI. Conclusion
The Suresh exception is not a helpful legal tool to navigate the complex security and
protection challenges in the post 9/11 era and indeed has the potential to create
additional legal and protection problems. It includes many flaws that are a reflection of
the era of political turmoil in which the decision took place. In a time when the focus
of states is on anti-terrorism measures, not on the protection of human rights, the
Canadian Supreme Court valued security interests higher than non-refoulement to
torture. In face of the absolute prohibition of torture there is no room for a balancing
process, and allowing for refoulement to torture under exceptional circumstances
violates Canada’s obligations under Article 3 of the CAT. The Suresh exception is
setting a negative precedent. Other states try to rely on it in order to justify refoulement
to torture, a conduct which further erodes the prohibition of torture, and undermines
international human rights law globally. The European Court of Human Rights was so
far successful in preventing the Suresh exception from gaining ground, at least
regionally on the territory of the States Parties to the ECHR. However, governments
continue to find ways around the non-refoulement rule, for example through
concluding a Memorandum of Understanding with the migrant’s country of origin
guaranteeing s/he will not be subjected to torture. This is a troubling trend eroding
human rights.
It is particularly concerning that Suresh takes place in a context where states are willing
to sacrifice fundamental human rights for the sake of national security. Refoulement to
torture and extraordinary rendition show how measures taken in the name of security
can get out of hand and cross the border into illegality. These drastic infringements of
human rights are built on the idea that threat to national security can justify any
violations. The weakness of this argument lies in the indeterminacy of what constitutes
such a threat. The international community has no uniform definition of terrorism and
the political agenda of individual states stands in the way of remedying this deficiency.
The vagueness of this term makes it susceptible to political manipulation for
stigmatizing opponents and renders it unfit as a legal basis for the possibility of
refoulement to torture. States tend to interpret all terrorism-related terms widely, for
example by considering an indirect threat to the country of refuge as sufficient to
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constitute a security threat. This goes against the purpose of Article 33(2) of the
Refugee Convention which asks for a direct negative impact to national security to
trigger the exception to non-refoulement. States also go too far in their interpretation
when they consider a loose association to a terrorist entity enough to declare a person
guilty of engaging in terrorism. The constant widening of the dragnet of who is
considered to be a terrorist threat ultimately undermines human rights law, it opens the
door for political misuse and heightens the risk of miscarriage of justice. To avoid the
violation of the absolute prohibition of torture and the inherent risks presented by an
undefined or vaguely defined concept of terrorism, courts should quash the possibility
of refoulement to torture, as advanced in the Suresh exception, and instead rely on an
alternative: domestic prosecution to determine whether somebody poses a security
threat and in case of a guilty verdict imprisonment to contain the security threat.
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